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Television  and the Public Interest
Cass R. Sunstein
The communications revolution has thrown into question the value of
imposing public interest obligations  on television broadcasters.  But the
distinctive nature of this unusual market-with "winner-take-all"features,
with viewers as a commodity, with pervasive externalities  from private
choices, and with market effects on preferences as well as the other way
around-justifies  a continuing role for government regulation  in the public
interest.  At the same time, regulation  best takes the form, not of anachro-
nistic command-and-control regulation, but of (1)  disclosure require-
ments,  (2)  economic incentives ("pay or  play"), and (3)  voluntary self-
regulation through a privately administered code. Some  discussion is
devoted to free speech and antitrust  issues, and to the different possible
shapes of liability and property rules in this context, treating  certain  pro-
gramming as a  public "good" akin to pollution as a  public bad.
INTRODUCTION
There is a large difference between the public interest and what inter-
ests  the public. This is so especially in light of the character and conse-
quences  of the communications  market.  One  of the central  goals of the
system of broadcasting,  private as well as public, should be to promote the
American aspiration to deliberative  democracy.' a system in which citizens
are informed about public issues and able to make judgments on the basis
of reasons. Both norms and law should be enlisted in this endeavor; if one
fails, the other becomes all the more important. These are the claims that I
attempt to bring to bear on the so-called communications revolution.
This  revolution  has  been  driven  by  extraordinary  technological
change.2  The rise  of cable  television,  the Internet,  satellite  television,
direcTV, and digital television has confounded ordinary understandings of
"television.'3 Before long, digital television may enable viewers to choose
1.  See, e.g.,  Amy  GUTMANN  & DENNIS  THOMPSON,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DISAGREEMENT  52-94
(1996)  (discussing ideals  of deliberative  democracy);  Joshua  Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in
DELIBERATIVE  DEMOCRACY  185,  185-231  (Jon Elster ed.,  1998) (discussing foundations of deliberative
democracy).
2.  A valuable  general  discussion  can  be  found  in  ANDREW  L.  SHAPIRO,  THE  CONTROL
REVOLUTION  (1999).
3.  See BRUCE M. OWEN,  THE  INTERNET  CHALLENGE TO  TELEVISION 311-26 (1999)  (dealing
with other dramatic technological developments).
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among over a thousand programs.4 The possible combination of television
and  the Internet,  a  combination  now  in its  early  stages,  may  prove  an
equally dramatic development;  the fact that the Internet is a partial substi-
tute  for  television  has  already  introduced  a  measure  of  competition
between the two.5
Law has responded to these developments in fits and starts, largely by
attempting to engraft legal requirements designed for the old environment
onto an altogether new communications market. The result is a high degree
of anachronism,  misfit, and  drift, and in the view of many observers,  a
series of constitutional violations.6 Most of the modem debate involves  a
vigorous  but increasingly  tired contest between  those  defending the old
regulatory order7  and those urging rapid movement toward "simple rules"
for government control of television, above all well-defined property rights
and freedom  of contract!  Strikingly  similar debates,  about the value  of
"simple  rules,"  the place of regulatory safeguards,  and the role of televi-
sion in a democracy,  can be found in many nations.9
My aim in this Article is to discuss  an important part of the intersec-
tion between the emerging communications  market and law:  public inter-
est obligations imposed on television broadcasters."  Since the initial rise of
broadcasting in the United States, government has treated the license  as a
kind of "grant" that is legitimately  accompanied by duties."  Congress  and
the FCC have required broadcasters  to follow a range of requirements-a
form of old-style "command-and-control"  regulation,  growing out  of an
4.  See Lawrie Mifflin, As Band of Channels Grows, Niche Programs  Will Boom, N. Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28,  1998, at Al.
5.  See  OWEN,  supra note  3,  at  311-26.  But see David  Goldberg  et  al.,  Conclusions, in
REGULATING  THE CHANGING  MEDIA:  A CoMPARATIVE  STUDY 295,  297 (David Goldberg et al. eds.,
1998)  ("[Clonvergence has been unequal between different nations, has been slower than expected and
will not break down distinctions between different markets as rapidly as is claimed.").
6.  See RATIONALES  &  RATIONALIZATIONS:  REGULATING  THE  ELECTRONIC  MEDIA  (Robert
Corn-Revere  ed.,  1997); Thomas G.  Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr.,  Converging First Amendment
Principles  for Converging Communications  Media, 104 YALE  L.J. 1719,  1725  (1995); Mark S. Fowler
& Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast  Regulation,  60 TEX. L. REv.  207, 209-10
(1982).
7.  This seems to me the general thrust of LEE  C. BOLLINGER,  IMAGES  OF A  FREE PRESS (1991)
and OWEN M. Fi S, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH  (1996).
8.  See RICHARD  A.  EPSTEIN,  SIMPLE  RULES  FOR  A  COMPLEX  WORLD  275-306  (1995)
(discussing environmental protection  and presenting  a general account of the role of government in a
way that is easily adapted to the area of communications);  RATIONALES  AND  RATIONALIZATIONS, supra
note 6 (offering a number of essays challenging any role for government aside from the definition and
enforcement of property rights).
9.  See MONROE E. PRICE,  TELEVISION:  THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND  NATIONAL  IDENTITY  (1995);
Goldberg et al., supra  note 5.
10.  I use this term to refer to literal broadcasters,  and thus not to include cable providers.  As we
will see, however,  the  distinction between  the two  seems  increasingly  (though  not yet  entirely)
artificial,  and much of the discussion will bear on the appropriate regulatory  stance toward television in
general.
11.  See discussion infra Part LA.
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understanding that there would be three, and only, three, private broadcast-
ing stations. Much, though far from all, of this regulation was eliminated in
the 1980s.1 2  A large question is the extent to which public interest require-
ments continue to make sense, or even to survive constitutional scrutiny, in
an entirely different communications  market where broadcasters  occupy a
decreasingly distinctive position.
The  question  was  posed  starkly  with  the  enactment  of  the
Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,3  one  of  whose  central  concerns
involved the rise of digital television. The Act had to deal with two issues.
First, who would have the right to broadcast digital television? Should the
licenses be sold, or auctioned, or given outright to existing broadcasters?
Second, what public interest obligations, if any, should attach to the own-
ership of a right to broadcast digital television? The Act squarely answered
the first question, 4  but was inconclusive on the second. In an extremely
controversial  step, Congress did not sell or auction  the right to broadcast
digital television, but basically gave the right to existing broadcasters  for
free.'  This has been described, and reasonably so, as a "huge giveaway"  of
"a $70  billion national  asset."'"  At the  same  time, Congress  refused  to
eliminate public interest obligations, delegating to the FCC the power to
decide whether such  obligations should be imposed on digital television
broadcasters,  and if so, in what form."  The FCC has not yet made  that
decision or even commenced formal proceedings.
In this Article, I offer two basic claims, one involving ends, the other
involving  means.  The first is  that in view  of the character  and conse-
quences of television programming,  any  system for the regulation of tele-
vision should be evaluated in democratic  as well as economic  terms. The
economic ideal of "consumer sovereignty"  is ill-suited to the communica-
tions market. It follows  that, at least in the near term, the changes  intro-
duced by the emerging communications  system do not justify abandoning
the idea that broadcasters  should be required to promote  public interest
goals. Educational  programming  and programming  that deals  with civic
questions can promote  the aspiration  to deliberative  democracy;  reliance
12.  See id.
13.  Pub. L. No. 104-104,  110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. §§  151-613
(Supp.  I  1997)) (amending the Communications  Act of 1934).
14.  See 47 U.S.C.  § 336(a).
15.  See id.
16.  What Price Digital Television?,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Dec.  26,  1998,  at A26; see also Federal
Management of the Radio Spectrum: Advanced Television Services: Hearing  Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 82  (1996) (statement of Robert
M. Pepper, Chief, Office of Plans and Policy, FCC) (stating that an auction would bring between $11  to
$70 billion in revenue).  For general criticism, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker,  The Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 29 CONN.  L. REv.  123,  163-64  (1996),  and Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker's  Road
Not Taken: The Political  Economy of  Broadcasting  in the Telecommunications  Act of 1996,29  CONN.
L. Rev. 353 (1996).
17.  See 47 U.S.C.  § 336(d).
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on an unregulated  market may not. There are also legitimate grounds for
encouraging broadcasters to make programming  accessible to people with
disabilities, above all the hearing impaired. I emphasize in this connection
some special characteristics of the broadcasting market, characteristics that
make it hazardous to rely on "consumer sovereignty" as the exclusive basis
for regulatory policy.  Instead communications  policy should be assessed,
at least in part, by reference to its effects on the public sphere."
My second claim is that in order to promote the relevant goals, gov-
ernment  should decreasingly  rely  on command-and-control  regulation, 9
and should consider instead three less intrusive and more flexible instru-
ments,  each  of which is  well-adapted  to  a period of rapid technological
change. The instruments are:  (1)  mandatory public disclosure of informa-
tion about public interest broadcasting, unaccompanied by content regula-
tion;  (2)  economic  incentives,  above  all  subsidies  and  "play  or pay";
and  (3)  voluntary self-regulation, as through a "code" of appropriate con-
duct, to be created and operated by the industry itself. These instruments
have played an increasing role in regulatory policy in general, especially in
the environmental  arena?° But they have rarely been discussed in the area
of communications,  where  they  have  a natural  place;2'  and  despite  its
growing  importance,  the  general  topic  of industry  self-regulation  has
received little academic attention.22
By requiring broadcasters  to disclose information about their public
interest activities,  the government might be able to enlist public pressure
and social norms so as to create a kind of competition to do more and bet-
ter. This is the simplest and least intrusive of regulatory  instruments. By
allowing broadcasters  to buy their way out of certain public interest obli-
gations,  the  government  should  be  able  to  ensure  that  those  with  an
18.  See PRICE,  supra note 9, at 194-246.  See generally  JORGEN  HABERMAS,  THE  STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION  OF THE  PUBLIC  SPHERE  (Thomas  Burger  trans.,  1989)  (offering  an  extended
historical discussion).
19.  A question not addressed  here is the content of any minimal  requirements; I emphasize  the
more flexible alternatives as the instruments of choice, without denying the need for some minima as a
"backstop." In the current system, for example, it may well make sense to require a degree of children's
programming and also free  air time for  candidates. See ADVISORY  COMMITTEE ON  PUBLIC  INTEREST
OBLIGATIONS  OF  DIGITAL  TELEVISION  BROADCASTERS,  CHARTING  THE  DIGITAL  BROADCASTING
FUTURE:  FINAL  REPORT  OF  THE  ADVISORY  COMMITTEE  ON  PUBLIC  INTEREST  OBLIGATIONS  OF
DIGITAL TELEVISION  BROADCASTERS  45-64 (1998)  [hereinafter FINAL  REPORT]. The precise extent of
mandatory programming is beyond the scope of the present discussion,  though I do refer to mandates  at
several points below.
20.  See  generally NEIL  GUNNINGHAM  ET  AL.,  SMART  REGULATION:  DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY 422-48 (1999); NATIONAL  ACAD.  OF PUB.  ADMIN.,  THE ENVIRONMENT  GOES
To MARKET  9-20 (1994); ANTHONY  OGUS,  REGULATION  121-49,245-56  (1998).
21.  The best discussion can be found in Angela J. Campbell,  Self-Regulation and the Media, 51
FED. CoMM. LJ. 711  (1999).
22.  The principal  exception can be found in an illuminating symposium issue in an Australian
law  review.  See Symposium,  Special Issue on  Self-Regulation,  19  LAW  & POL'Y  363  (1997)
[hereinafter Special Issue on Self-Regulation].
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incentive to produce  good programming are actually doing so, while also
producing the lowest-cost  means  of promoting public  interest program-
ming. And by encouraging  (not mandating)  voluntary self-regulation,  the
government can help overcome a kind of prisoner's dilemma faced by par-
ticipants  in  a  "winner-take-all"  market, I  a  prisoner's  dilemma  that
contributes to a range of social problems, often stemming from a kind of
"race to the bottom" with respect to programming quality.
It should be clear that this basic approach combines  a recognition  of
the serious limits of unrestrained communications  markets  in promoting
social goals with a plea for rejecting traditional regulation and for enlisting
more flexible, market-oriented  instruments in the service  of those goals.
This approach is consistent with some incipient but quite general trends in
regulatory law. 4 If the approach is sound, it is well-suited to the emerging
communications  market;  but it is easily  adapted to other  areas  as well,
including environmental  degradation,  occupational  safety and health,  and
other social problems. It is much too soon to say whether there is a "third
way" between traditional command-and-control  regulation and reliance on
free trade and well-defined property rights.'s But if there is indeed a "third
way," it is likely to be found in proposals of this kind.
A general  theme  of this Article  is that disclosure,  economic incen-
tives, and voluntary self-regulation might displace government command-
and-control in a variety of areas of regulatory law. Specific themes include
requiring producers  simply to disclose goods and bads; relaxing  antitrust
law so  as to permit cooperation  designed to reduce some of the problems
associated with "races to the bottom";  and building on emerging develop-
ments in  environmental  protection  so  as to  allow far more imaginative
"trades" among producers. In short, it is time to move beyond the view that
market ordering and content regulation  are the only two possibilities for
communications  law. There are many alternatives,  and real progress can
come only from exploring the choices among them.
The Article comes in seven parts. Part I sets  the stage,  outlining the
history  of regulation,  identifying  some  relevant puzzles,  and exploring
some diverse problems with television in its current form. Part II, the theo-
retical  heart of the  Article,  evaluates  and  rejects  the  claim  that in the
emerging media market there is no longer room for public interest regula-
tion of any kind. I suggest that television is no ordinary commodity, partly
23.  See  ROBERT  H. FRANK  &  PHILLIP J.  COOK,  THE  WINNER-TAKE-ALL  SOCIETY  189-209
(1995).  The most important distinguishing  feature of "winner-take-alr'  markets  is  that rewards  are
based  on "relative rather than (or in addition to) absolute performance."  Id.  at 24. In such markets,
"rewards tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few top performers." Id.
24.  See, e.g., GUNNINGHAM  ET  AL., supra  note 20, at 37-91; NATIONAL  ACAD.  OF PuB. ADIN.,
supra note 20; Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational  Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613,  618-33 (1999).
25.  For a general discussion, see ANTHONY  GIDDENS,  THE THIRD WAY (1998).
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because of the collective benefits of good programming, partly because  of
the link between television and democracy, and partly because viewers are
more  like products  offered  to  advertisers  than  consumers  paying  for
entertainment  on their own. Part  I  discusses the relation between  princi-
ple and practice; it traces likely stages of the emerging market, with broad-
cast programming becoming increasingly like general-interest  magazines.
Part IV deals with disclosure,  exploring the possibility that relevant private
groups,  invoking  widespread  social  norms,  can  interact  to  produce
improvements  in the broadcasting  market without  compulsory program-
ming of any kind. Part V deals with economic  incentives, beginning with
the idea of "play or pay," and then adapting  some ideas from the law of
tort to the law of broadcasting. Part VI examines whether a code of broad-
casting  might  operate  as  a kind of positional  arms  control  agreement,
helping to counteract a situation in which broadcasters  compete  to the det-
riment  of collective  goals.  Part VII  is  a brief  summary  of regulatory
options.
I
HISTORY,  PUZZLES, PROBLEMS
A.  A Brief  Historical  Overview 26
Broadcast  licenses have  never  been  treated like  ordinary  property
rights, open for sale on the free market.27 Since the initial enactment of the
Communications  Act  of  1934,  the  government  has  awarded  licenses
to broadcasters  in accordance  with "convenience,  public  interest,  [and]
necessity."'  The Federal  Radio  Commission  early  described the system
as  one  in  which  broadcasters  "must  be  operated  as  if  owned  by  the
public....  It is as if a community should own a station and turn it over to
the best man  in sight with  this injunction:  'Manage  this  station in our
interest ....  ",29 Under this "public trustee" standard, the FCC has imposed
a range of obligations  on broadcasters-an idea that perhaps made special
sense when a small number of companies dominated the television market.
In its  initial  set of guidelines,  the  FCC  required  stations  to  meet
the  "tastes,  needs,  and  desires  of  all  substantial  groups  among  the
listening public...  ."  This required  "a well-rounded  program, in which
26.  This Section  draws on the first section of the FINAL REPORT, supra note  19, at 3-16. See also
Campbell, supra  note 21, for detailed discussion of many relevant developments.
27.  See  the  colorful,  skeptical  presentation  in  PETER  HUBER,  LAW  AND  DISORDER  IN
CYBERSPACE:  ABOLISH THE FCC AND  LET COMMON  LAW RULE THE TELECOSM  3-9 (1997).
28.  47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
29.  The Federal Radio  Commission and the Public Service  Responsibility of Broadcast
Licensees, 11  FED.  Comm.  BAR  J. 5,  14 (1950)  (quoting Schaeffer Radio Co., an unpublished  1930
Federal Radio Commission  decision).
30.  Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.,  3 Fed. Radio Comm'n, Ann. Rep. 32, 34 (1929), modified on
other grounds,  37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
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entertainment,  consisting of music  of both  classical  and lighter grades,
religion, education and instruction, important public events, discussions of
public questions,  weather, market reports, and news, and matters of interest
to all members of the family, find a place."31
Often this kind of guidance operated as a general plea, with little sys-
tematic enforcement. In 1960, however, the FCC went so far as to outline
fourteen  of the  "major  elements  usually  necessary  to meet  the  public
interest." 32 These included:  religious programming, programs for children,
political broadcasts, news programs, sports programs, weather and market
services,  and development  and use of local talent. 33 The FCC  eventually
specified its general guidelines, which were merely indicia of the types and
areas  of  appropriate  service.  The  specifications  included  minimum
amounts  for news, public  affairs,  and  other nonentertainment  program-
ming, including the controversial "fairness doctrine"'  and also access rules
for prime-time. 5
Substantial  changes  occurred  in the  1980s,  a period of significant
deregulation.  The head of the FCC, Mark Fowler, declared  (in a kind of
soundbite,  or bumper-sticker, for the market  approach  to the topic)  that
television is "'just another  appliance,'  a "'toaster  with pictures."'36 The
fairness doctrine was largely eliminated, and many of the more particular
public interest  requirements  were removed?'  Nonetheless,  a  number  of
such requirements remain. For example, the FCC continues  to say that if a
broadcaster  sells  airtime  to one  candidate,  it must  sell similar  time  to
opposing  candidates  as well. Congress  itself has  codified  a right of this
kind?8 A long-standing  statutory provision,  in the obvious self-interest of
law makers, requires that if a broadcaster offers to sell time, it must do so
at the "lowest unit rate of the station" during the forty-five days before a
31.  Id.
32.  Report and Statement of Policy Res:  Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.
2303,2314 (1960).
33.  See id
34.  In brief, the fairness doctrine required broadcasters  to attend to public issues and to ensure a
diversity of views. On the doctrine, see discussion infra  Part II.A.
35.  See Amendment to Section  0.281  of the Commission's Rules:  Delegations of Authority  to
the  Chief,  Broadcast  Bureau,  59  F.C.C.2d  491,  493  (1976);  Amendment  of Part  73  of  the
Commission's  Rules  and Regulations  with Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network
Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 385-88 (1970).
36.  Bernard  D. Nossiter, Licenses to  Coin Money:  The F.C.C.'s Big Giveaway  Show, 241
NATION 402 (1985)  (quoting radio address given by Mark Fowler).
37.  See  The  Revision  of  Programming  and  Commercialization  Policies,  Ascertainment
Requirements,  and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984);  see also Revision of Applications  for Renewals, 49 R.R.2d  470 (1981)  (postcard renewals);
Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5043, 5054-55 (1987)  (repealing
most of fairness doctrine), affd sub nom  Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC,  867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
38.  See 47 U.S.C. §  315  (1994).
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primary election and during the sixty days before a general or special elec-
tion. 9
In recent years  Congress has devoted  special  attention  to children's
programming  and to television  access for the hearing impaired.  In  1990,
Congress  enacted the  Children's  Television  Act  of 1990,'  limiting  the
advertising  on children's  programming  (twelve  minutes per hour during
weekdays and ten and a half minutes per hour on weekends). 4 1  Under this
statute, the FCC has further required broadcasters to provide three hours of
children's programming per week.42 The Television Decoder Circuitry Act
of  1990"3  requires  new  television  sets  to  have  special  decoder  chips,
allowing them to display closed-captioned television transmissions  for the
hearing impaired. The Telecommunications  Act of 199 644 requires use of
"v-chip"  technology,  designed  to  facilitate parental  control  over what
enters the home; it also contains ancillary requirements intended to ensure
"ratings"  of programming content.45
B.  Two Puzzles
Turn now to the present, or at least to the more recent past. From 1997
to  1998, a presidential advisory committee met to discuss the public inter-
est obligation of television broadcasters.46  Several of the broadcasters  on
the  Committee  were  quite skeptical  about governmental  mandates,  but
highly receptive to the idea of adopting some kind of broadcasting  "code,"
akin to the kind approved and administered by the National Association of
Broadcasters  (NAB) between  1928 and 1979. 4 1 The Committee  eventually
moved toward endorsing the notion of a code, and the idea received con-
siderable attention in the trade press. 4
In its annual  meeting, however, the NAB signaled skepticism  about
the idea and came very close to saying "no"  and "never."  A large part of
the broadcasters'  objection was that any "code"  would violate the antitrust
laws. This was very odd because in their discussions, members of the NAB
39.  Id.  § 315(b).
40.  Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
41.  See 47 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994).
42.  See Broadcast Services:  Children's Television, 61 C.F.R. § 43981, 43988 (1996).
43.  47 U.S.C.  § 303(u).
44.  Pub. L. No. 104-104,  110 Stat. 56 (codified in  scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.  §§  151-613
(Supp. 11T  1997)).
45.  See the general discussion in JAMES  T.  HAMILTON,  CHANNELING  VIOLENCE:  THE ECONOMIC
MARKET FOR VIOLENT TELEVISION PROGRAMMING  302-11 (1998).
46.  I draw on personal recollections  here. See FINAL REPORT, supra note  19. Transcripts of the
relevant meetings  can be found on the web  site of the Advisory  Committee on the Public  Interest
Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters at <http:llwww.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.
pdf>.
47.  See discussion infra Part V.B; see also Campbell, supra note 21, at 720-35.
48.  See, e.g., Gore Proposals  Go  to White House, TELEVISION  DIGEST,  Dec.  21,  1998.;  Gore
Recommendations  on Digital  Standards  Go to White House, COMM.  DAILY, Dec. 21,  1998.
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treated  the possibility of an antitrust  violation as  extremely  good news.
Take this as the first puzzle; it is not often that high-level corporate offi-
cials  are  smiling when they  discuss the possibility that their own  action
would be found unlawful.
Consider a second puzzle. During the committee's deliberations, some
people  argued on behalf of a "play or pay" system, in which broadcasters
would be relieved of public interest obligations  (to "play")  if they  agree
instead to "pay" someone else-another broadcaster-to  do so. But many
of the broadcasters on the committee were quite skeptical of this approach,
arguing  that public interest obligations were part of the (sacred?) duty of
every  broadcaster, and that no  one should be exempted  for a price. This
was also very odd. It is not often that high-level corporate officials prefer
rigid  government mandates  to more flexible  approaches.  What explains
these puzzles? The answers-offered in closing here49-- reveal a great deal
about the emerging market.
C.  Identifying the Problem
To evaluate  particular proposals,  it is necessary  to have  a concrete
sense of why some people think that even well-functioning television mar-
kets are inadequate. Consider the following possibilities, each of which has
produced public concern in the last decade:5 0
1.  There may be insufficient educational programming for children.
The existing fare may be insufficient because there is too little
simply  in terms of amount (for example,  for people who lack
cable), or because children do not watch the stations on which it
is available, or because the quality is too low.
2.  Programming  may not be sufficiently  accessible to people  who
are hearing impaired; this may be a particular problem if citizens
are unable to find out about emergencies, or if they are unable to
understand programming  that  bears  on central  public  issues."
The exclusion may  have  practical  consequences;  it may  even
produce a form of humiliation. 2
3.  At  least  on  the  major  networks,  programming  may  be  too
homogenous,  in  a form of "blind-leading-the-blind"  program-
ming. Since a significant percentage of Americans do not receive
49.  See infra  Part IV.F.
50.  For different angles, see, for example, FINAL  REPORT, supra note  19; HAMILTON,  supra note
45, at 3-50 (discussing television violence as a public policy issue); NEWTON N. MINOW  & CRAIG  L.
LAMAY, ABANDONED  IN THE WASTELAND:  CHILDREN,  TELEVISION,  AND  THE FIRST AMENDMENT  10-
45 (1995)  (arguing that the system serves the best interests of advertisers rather than children); DANNY
ScHwCnmpT,  THm MORE You WATCH, THm LESS You KNOW (1997)  (examining the content of news).
51.  See FINAL REPORT, supra  note  19, at 30-31.
52.  On the  notion of humiliation,  see AvisiM  MARGALIT,  THE  DECENT  SOCIETY  (Naomi
Goldblum trans., 1996).
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cable television  and depend on broadcasters, the result may be
insufficient variety in programming."
4.  Some programming  may be affirmatively bad for children if, for
example, it contains excessive violence, or otherwise encourages
behavior that is dangerous  to self and others.  The result of such
programming may be to produce violent or otherwise dangerous
behavior in the real world."
5.  There may  be too  much violent programming  in general,  with
adverse consequences for adults, not only children! 5 The adverse
consequences  may include an  increase in violence  (because  of
changes  in social norms or "copycat"  effects56), general demor-
alization and fear, or a misperception of reality.
6.  News  coverage  may be a form of "infotainment,"  dealing  not
with real issues, but with gossip about celebrities and unsubstan-
tiated charges of various kinds. 7
7.  There may be too little coverage of serious questions,  especially
during political campaigns.  The relevant  coverage may involve
sensationalism  and "sound  bites,"  or attention  to who  is  ahead
("horse-race  issues") rather than who thinks what and why. The
result may be an insufficiently informed citizenry. 8
8.  Stations too rarely cover international issues or developments  in
other nations. The result is that people are extremely ill-informed
about the global background  for national  events,  including pro-
posed financial assistance and possibly  even war, and also about
practices  other than their own. This ignorance makes it difficult
53.  See discussion infra Part U.A.2.
54.  See HAMILTON, supra  note 45, at 20-30, for evidence.
55.  See id (providing a detailed discussion).
56.  For evidence, see ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 62-64, 263-67 (6th ed. 1992).
57.  See generally  SCI-ECHTER,  supra  note 50.
58.  See  KIKU  ADATrO,  SOUND-BITE  DEMOCRACY  (1990),  for general  discussion;  and JOHN
DE  EY, THE PUBLIC  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS:  AN ESSAY  IN POLITICAL  INQUIRY  179-80  (Gateway  Books
1946) (1927):
A glance at the situation shows that the physical and external means of collecting information
in regard to what is happening in the world have far outrun the intellectual phase of inquiry
and  organization of its results.  Telegraph, telephone,  and  now the radio, cheap  and quick
mails ...  have attained a remarkable development. But when we ask what sort of material is
recorded  and how  it is  organized, when  we ask about  the intellectual form in  which  the
material is presented, the tale to be told is very different. "News" signifies  something  which
has  just  happened,  and  which  is  new  just  because  it  deviates  from  the  old  and
regular...  [W]e have here an  explanation of the triviality and  "sensational" quality  of so
much of what passes  as news.  The catastrophic,  namely, crime,  accidents,  family rows,
personal clashes  and conflicts, are the most obvious forms of breaches of continuity ...  they
are the new par excellence ....
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for people  to  deliberate  well  about  important  questions  and
evaluate purely national practices. 9
9.  It may be too expensive for candidates to reach the electorate via
television. The result may be excessive competition  to accumu-
late funds simply in order to have access to television; this com-
petition may have corrosive effects on the electoral process. Free
air time would be a possible response, perhaps  qualified by an
obligation, on the part of the candidate,  to speak for at least fifty
percent of the time or to refrain from negative campaigning.
10.  There may be too little substantive  diversity of view-too little
debate among people with genuinely different perspectives about
issues of policy and fact. Here too, the result may be an insuffi-
ciently informed citizenry.'
11.  The problem may be not homogeneity but heterogeneity,  which
may result in a highly balkanized viewing public, in which many
or most people  lack shared  viewing  experiences,  or in which
people view programming  that largely reinforces their own con-
victions and prejudices I The result can be extremism and frag-
mentation.62
To  be  sure,  some  of these  problems  cannot  be  corrected  through
regulation that is either feasible or constitutional. Moreover, these various
conceptions of the relevant problem point toward diverse solutions, some
of which  would raise serious  First  Amendment  problems,  as discussed
below. 63 A particular challenge is to develop approaches that would allow a
high degree of flexibility, minimize government involvement in program-
ming content, and also do some good.
II
PREFERENCES  AND AUDIENCES
It has increasingly been urged that any objections to existing televi-
sion are elitist or outmoded.  On one view, public interest obligations have
no place in modem law, particularly  because the "scarcity"  rationale for
59.  See  generally SUSAN D. MUELLER,  LUMPUSSION  FATIGUE  (1999); MARTHA  C.  NUSSBAUM,
CULTIVATING HumANrrY  (1997).
60.  See C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens  Need,  147 U. PA. L. REv. 317,383-408  (1998).
61.  See the discussion of oversteering and balkanization in SHAPIRO, supra  note 2, at 105-32.
62.  See  id.  See  also  the  discussion  of  group  polarization  in  PATRICIA  WALLACE,  THE
PSYCHOLOGY  OF THE INTERNET 73-78  (1999); David  Schkade et al.,  Are Juries More Erratic than
Individuals?, COLUM.  L.  REv.  (forthcoming  2000);  and  Cass  D.  Sunstein,  The  Law  of Group
Polarization (Jan. 3, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
63.  See discussion infra  Part II.B.6.
64.  See generally  HUBER, supra  note 27; Fowler & Brenner, supra  note 6.
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regulation grows weaker every day;65 it has even been urged that the FCC
no longer has any appropriate role.'  Once the problem of scarcity has been
eliminated, individual consumers can design their own preferred commu-
nications package,  at least if the government permits them to do so. Con-
sider  this  utopian  picture  of  a  system  of  unrestricted  markets  in
communications:
There  will  be room  enough  for every  sight  and  sound,  every
thought and  expression that  any  human  mind will  ever wish to
convey.  It  will be  a  place  where  young  minds  can  wander  in
adventurous,  irresponsible,  ungenteel  ways.  It will  contain  not
innocence but a sort of native gaiety, a buoyant,  carefree feeling,
filled with confidence in the future and an unquenchable  sense of
freedom and opportunity.
A  conceptual  point first:  though  many  people  claim  to  argue  for
"deregulation,"  that route is not in fact an option, or at least not a reason-
able one. What "deregulation" really means is a shift from the status quo to
a system of different but emphatically legal regulation, more specifically
one of property, tort, and contract rights,  in which  government  does not
impose specific public interest obligations  but instead sets up initial end-
tlements  and then permits  trades among  owners  and producers.  This is a
regulatory system as much as  any  other. If it seems  close to the current
system for newspapers and magazines, it is no less a regulatory system for
that reason;  a great deal of law (inevitably) governs the rights and duties
of newspapers  and magazines.  Such  law  imposes  rights  and  duties,
65.  As  noted  below,  the  rationale  has  not disappeared;  well  over  one-third  of American
households continue to depend on free, over-the-air  broadcasting.  See U.S.  BUREAU  OF THE  CENSUS,
STATISTICAL  ABSTRACT  OF THE  UNITED  STATES:  1998  at 573  (118th  ed.  1998)  (Table No.  915,
Utilization of Selected Media:  1970 to  1996). On  some of the difficulties with  the whole  notion of
scarcity, see R.H. Coase,  The Federal  Communications Commission, 2J.L. & ECON.  1 (1959).  The
defect of Coase's analysis is his (remarkable) lack of self-consciousness  about the idea that consumer
sovereignty is the appropriate ideal for broadcasting; it is as if that idea is so self-evidently correct that
it need not even be defended.
66.  See HUBER, supra  note 27, at 3-9. See also, in a different vein, LAWRENCE LESSIG,  CODE AND
OTHER  LAWS  OF  CYBERSPACE  188-90  (1999)  (arguing  that a growing body  of technical  research
suggests  the FCC  is  unnecessary);  Yochai  Benkler  &  Lawrence  Lessig,  Net Gains, THE  NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec.  14, 1998, at 15 (same).
67.  HUBER,  supra  note 27, at 206.
68.  I do not deal here with the question why broadcasters and  newspapers  should be subject to
different legal regimes. As a matter of fact, the difference seems to be a historical  accident, associated
with the particular form of regulation chosen for broadcasting.  See id. at 4-9. As a matter of principle,
the difference has been justified as a way of ensuring two competing  regulatory regimes, each well-
designed to combat the vices associated with the other. See generally BOLLINGER,  supra  note 7. In my
view, this justification is serious but not convincing,  and some measures  designed to promote  a well-
functioning  democratic  culture might well be justified  as  applied to  newspapers  too.  See CASS  R.
SUNSTEIN,  DEMOCRACY  AND  THE PROBLEM  OF FREE SPEECH  107-08  (1993).  For example,  it would not
be unconstitutional,  in my view, for government  to require large metropolitan  newspapers  to have  a
"letters to the editor" page, or to require such newspapers  to disclose their public service activities, or
to require  such newspapers to publish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, paid political advertising. For the
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permissions and prohibitions; among other things, it ensures, via the law of
property, that some people, and not others, will have access to the public
sphere. The issue is thus not whether to "deregulate,"  but whether  one or
another regulatory system is better than imaginable alternatives.
Notice that this  is  a purely conceptual  claim; it is not a normative
argument of any kind. Any market system necessarily depends on regula-
tory controls, in the form of an assignment (by law) of property rights and
(legal) rules of contract.9 A system of television is hard to imagine without
ownership rights; in the absence of ownership rights, who could use whose
spectrum for what purpose? It is no answer to point to voluntary  arrange-
ments. Such arrangements  are likely to break down without rules of law
allowing  some people  to exclude  others. If the  Columbia Broadcasting
System does not have a legal right to own spectrum and to enter into bind-
ing agreements with others, it will not be able to provide television  as we
know it. This point should be a familiar one for land and other "tangible"
property; it is no less true for the services provided by television. Indeed, it
holds, though to a lesser extent, for those who have web sites and provide
services  over the Internet; without legal protection against trespasses,  and
without  a right to  enter into legally enforceable  agreements,  web  sites
would be a modern version of the state of nature-a battleground rather
than a framework for productive relationships. 0
I therefore turn to the general question whether there remains any rea-
son for government to regulate television in the "public interest." My con-
cern here is both theoretical and empirical. The question is whether, in the
current market, broadcasters are likely to provide viewers what they would
like to see, and if so, whether that point is decisive on the question whether
public interest obligations should be imposed.71  The brief answer is that the
idea that broadcasters  show  "what viewers  want" is a quite inadequate
response  to the argument for public interest obligations.72  The discussion
most part, however, such requirements  do not seem necessary. But I cannot discuss these issues in
detail here.
69.  In certain  circumstances,  norms  may  successfully  do the  work  of law. See  ROBERT  C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WIrHotrr LAw 4-6 (1991). But even in such circumstances, legal rules of property
and contract generally loom in the background.
70.  See Neil  W. Netanel,  Cyberspace Self-Governance: A  Skeptical  View from  Liberal
Democratic  Theory, 88 CALm. L. Rlv. 395 (2000). Of course it is possible to imagine the Internet as a
form of genuine  anarchy, unregulated  by legal rules, with norms and self-help  (in the form of code)
doing the work ordinarily done by the law of contract and property.  Interestingly, the Internet is not
subject  to the  usual legal  realist  claim that  private ordering  is  dependent  on law  and that law  is
inevitable.  See CAss R. Su1.sTEIN,  THE PARTIAL  CONSTITUTION 51-54 (1993). But it is very hard to
imagine this  state of affairs for television,  and those most critical of the existing legal structure seek
only to replace one legal regime with another. See HUBER,  supra  note 27, at 5-30.
71.  At several  points I draw  on the superb  discussion  found in  C. Edwin  Baker, Giving the
Audience What It Wants, 58  OMO ST. L.  311  (1997).
72.  See id.
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here deals with the technological present and the short-term future; later I
introduce complications from emerging technological developments.
A.  Three Market Failures
According to the economic model, a well-functioning  television mar-
ket would promote  the ideal of consumer  sovereignty.  On  this view, the
point of markets is to satisfy consumer preferences. In this system, people
would satisfy their "preferences,"  as these are measured via the criterion of
private willingness to pay. People would be able to choose from a range of
options, and suppliers would cater to their tastes. To a considerable  extent,
of course, the existing  system already  approaches  this  ideal,  and this is
increasingly the case. But there are three serious problems, each suggesting
that the economic ideal of consumer sovereignty  is not in fact served by
free  markets in programming.  These  are market failures if it is  assumed
that the purpose  of a well-functioning  television market is to ensure that
programming  is well-matched  to viewer preferences.  In the next  Part, I
question the market ideal itself.
1.  Eyeballs as the Commodity
The first point is the simplest. Currently television  is not an ordinary
product, for broadcasters  do not sell programming  to viewers in return for
cash. A system of "pay-per-view"  would indeed fit the usual commodity
model; but "pay-per-view"  continues to be a relatively rare practice. The
difference between the existing broadcasting market and "pay-per-view"  is
quite important. The key problem here is that viewers do not pay a price,
market or otherwise, for television. As  C. Edwin  Baker has shown,  it is
more  accurate  to say  that viewers  are  a  commodity,  or a product,  that
broadcasters deliver to the people who actually pay them:  advertisers.73
This phenomenon introduces  some serious distortions,  at least if we
understand  an ideal broadcasting market as one in which viewers receive
what they want. From the standpoint of consumer sovereignty, the role of
advertisers  creates  market failures.  Of course  broadcasters  seek,  other
things  being  equal,  to  deliver more rather  than  fewer viewers  because
advertisers seek, other things being equal, more rather than fewer viewers.
But advertisers have issues and agendas  of their own,  and the interests of
advertisers can push broadcasters in, or away from, directions that viewers,
or substantial numbers of them, would like.
This is a substantial difference from the ordinary marketplace. Adver-
tisers like certain demographic  groups and dislike  others,  even when the
numbers are equal;  they pay extra amounts in order to attract groups  that
are likely to purchase the relevant products, and this affects programming
73.  See C. EDWIN  BAKER, ADVERTISING  AND A DEMOCRATIC  PRESs 25-87 (1994).
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content.74 Advertisers do not want programming that draws product safety
into question, particularly if it concerns their own products and sometimes
even more generally. 75  In addition, advertisers want programming that will
put  viewers  in  a  receptive  purchasing  mood,  and  hence  not  be  too
"depressing."76  Advertisers also tend to dislike programming that is highly
controversial or that is too serious, and hence avoid sponsoring shows that
take stands on public issues.'  In these ways, the fact that broadcasters  are
delivering  viewers  to  advertisers-this  is  largely  their  charge,  under
existing  arrangements--can  produce offerings  that diverge  considerably
from what would emerge if viewers were paying directly for programming.
To  this extent  the notion  of consumer  sovereignty  is seriously  compro-
mised whenever programming decisions are a product of advertiser wishes.
2.  Informational  Cascades  and Broadcaster  Homogeneity
A second problem is that it is not clear whether broadcasters are now
engaged,  in anything  like a systematic  or scientific  way,  in catering  to
public tastes. At first glance it would seem obvious that broadcasters  must
be  engaged  in  this  endeavor  (subject  to  the  qualification  just  stated,
involving the role of advertisers); if broadcasters are maximizing anything,
they must be maximizing  viewers  (subject  to the same  qualification).  In
general, attracting viewers is their job7  But there is reason to question this
judgment, at least in its simplest form. Sometimes rational  people make
decisions not on the basis of a full inspection of the alternatives, but on the
basis of an understanding of what other people are doing.79 Because people
obtain information  from other  people's actions,  individual  actions  carry
with  them one  or more  "informational  externalities,"  which potentially
affect the decisions of others. Thus, rational and boundedly rational people,
in business  as elsewhere, rely on the signals  provided by the words  and
deeds of others.'0 This reliance can produce cascade effects, as B follows A,
and C follows  B and A,  and D, as a rational agent, follows  the collected
wisdom embodied  in the actions  of A,  B,  and  C. Informational  cascades
often produce unfortunate outcomes, in fact outcomes far worse than those
that would  result if individuals  accumulated  information  on their own.
Sometimes, moreover, people use the "availability"  heuristic, deeming  an
event more probable if an instance of its occurrence can be readily brought
74.  See id.  at 66-70.
75.  See id.  at 50-56.
76.  See id.  at 62-66.
77.  See id.
78.  See generally  ScHEcHTER, supra  note 50.
79.  See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning  from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads,
and Informational  Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP.  151,  164 (1998).
80.  In a related vein, see Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle  on Sixth Avenue:  Information
Externalities  and Search, 108 ECON. J. 60 (1998).
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to mind.8  Using the availability heuristic, broadcasters might reason that if
one  show  or another  has  attracted  substantial  viewers  in the past,  they
should copy it.  The  result would be "fads"  and "fashions"  in program-
ruing.
82
In theory, then, broadcasters might be building on the programming
judgments  of  other  broadcasters,  often,  perhaps,  reacting  to  the
"availability"  of salient recent instances in which a particular program was
especially  popular (dealing,  let us  suppose, with  the Clinton-Lewinsky
scandal or the O.J.  Simpson trial) or especially unpopular (dealing, let us
suppose, with South Africa). If this is true, private decisions by broadcast-
ers may produce both mistakes and homogeneity-mistakes,  in the form of
programming  that is not what viewers want, and homogeneity,  in the form
of the "blind leading the blind."83
Recent evidence  suggests that this theoretical  account has consider-
able truth. A careful study shows that there is a good deal of simple imita-
tion,  as  networks  provide  a  certain  kind  of programming  simply  by
imitating  whatever  other networks  are  doing  Recently popular  shows
tend to create cascade effects. This imitative behavior is not in the interest
of viewers. On the contrary, it creates a kind of homogeneity and uniform-
ity in the broadcasting market, and thus makes  for problems  in terms  of
providing what viewers "want."'  This is not a conventional market failure,
but it suggests  that existing decisions  are  unlikely  to promote consumer
sovereignty. The problem is rapidly diminishing with an increase in avail-
able programming  options,  but to the extent that substantial  numbers of
people continue to depend on a small number of broadcasters, the existence
of informational  cascades  suggests that the market does not entirely  pro-
mote consumer sovereignty.
3.  Externalities  and Collective Action Problems
Even  if broadcasters  did provide  each viewer  with  what he  or she
wanted, a significant problem would remain, and from the economic point
of view, this is probably the most serious of all. Information is  a public
good, and once one person knows something  (about, for example, product
hazards,  asthma, official misconduct, poverty, welfare reform, or abuse of
81.  See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV.  683, 711-14 (1999).
82.  See Bikhchandani  et al., supra  note 79, at 161-62.
83.  See  David  Hirshleifer,  The  Blind Leading the  Blind:  Social Influence,  Fads, and
Informational Cascades,  in THE  NEW  ECONOMICS  OF HUMAN  BEHAVIOR  188  (Mariano  Tommasi  &
Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995).
84.  See Robert E. Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Competitive Convergence:  An Empirical Test for
Herd Behavior in Prime-Time  Television Programming  (1999)  (Harvard Business School Working
Paper 96-025, on file with the California  Law Review).
85.  See id.
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power), the benefits of that knowledge  will probably  accrue to others. 6
Note in this regard Amartya Sen's remarkable  observation that no famine
has ever occurred in a democratic country  with a free press. 87 This obser-
vation is complemented by a series of less dramatic ones, showing the sub-
stantial benefits for individual citizens of a media that is willing and able to
devote attention  to public concerns,  including the plight of the disadvan-
taged.88 Individual choices  by individual viewers  are highly likely to pro-
duce  too little public  interest  programming  in light  of the fact  that the
benefits of viewing such programming  are not fully "internalized"  by indi-
vidual viewers. Thus, individually rational decisions may inflict costs on
others at the same time that they fail to confer benefits on others. In this
respect, the problem "is not that people choose unwisely as individuals, but
that the collective consequences  of their choices often turn out to be very
different from what they desire or anticipate." 9
Most generally, there are multiple external effects in the broadcasting
area;  some of these are positive, but unlikely to be generated  sufficiently
by individual choices,  while others are  negative,  and likely to be exces-
sively produced by individual choices.  Consider a decision to watch vio-
lent programming.  In short, the effects of broadcasting  depend on social
interactions.  Many  of the resulting problems  are  connected with  demo-
cratic ideals. A culture in which each person sees a high degree of serious
programming  may well lead to better political judgments; greater knowl-
edge on the part of one person often leads to more knowledge  on the part
of others with whom she interacts.9' Perhaps most important, a degree of
serious attention to public issues can lead to improved governance through
deterring abuses and encouraging governmental response to glaring prob-
lems.  In these  various  ways, public interest programming  can produce
social  benefits  that will not  be  adequately  captured  by the  individual
choices of individual citizens; the same is true for programming that pro-
duces social costs, including apathy, fear, and increased criminal activity.'
Because  of the  collective  action  problem,  an unregulated  market  will
underproduce public goods and overproduce public bads.
86.  An illuminating and detailed discussion is Baker, supra  note 71, at 350-85.
87.  See JEAN DREZE &  AmARTYA  SEN, INDIA  76 (1995).
88.  See id  at 75-76, 173,  191.
89.  FRANK  & COOK,  supra note  23, at 191; see also PIERRE BouRDIEu,  ON  TELEVISION  9-29
(Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, trans., The New Press  1998); Baker, supra  note 71,  at 350-85.
90.  See HAmILTON,  supra  note 45, at 3-49 (discussing the market for violence).
91.  See Baker, supra  note 71, at 350-67.
92.  See id. at 355-56; see also HAwLTON,  supra  note 45, at 20-30,285-322.
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B.  Problems  on Nonmarket Criteria: Children,  Deliberative
Democracy,  and Related  Issues
Thus  far the discussion  has emphasized  difficulties  with  television
markets  on  conventional  economic  grounds; but it is  wrong  to endorse
purely market approaches to television. 93 Television is not best understood
as  an ordinary  commodity,  subject to the forces  of supply  and  demand.
There are  several reasons  why this is  so. The unifying theme is that the
American  political  tradition  is  committed  to  the  ideal  of  deliberative
democracy,'  an ideal  that has animated  much First Amendment doctrine
and media  regulation in general."  Even if the media  market were  well-
functioning  from the economic  point of view,  there would be  room for
measures  designed to promote  a well-functioning  system  of democratic
deliberation, especially in view of the importance of television to people's
judgments  about what issues are important and about what it is reasonable
to think.96 Consider, by way of general orientation, John Dewey's sugges-
tion:
[W]hat is more significant  is that counting of heads compels prior
recourse  to methods  of discussion,  consultation  and persuasion,
while the essence of appeal to force is to cut short resort to such
methods.  Majority  rule, just as majority rule,  is  as foolish as its
critics  charge  it  with  being.  But  it  never  is  merely majority
rule....  The important  consideration is that opportunity be given
that  idea  to  spread  and  to  become  the  possession  of  the
multitude....  The  essential  need,  in  other  words,  is  the
improvement  of the methods  and conditions of debate,  discussion
and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.'
1.  Children  and the Hearing  Impaired
A  well-functioning  market may  fail  to serve  certain  categories  of
viewers. Of these the most obvious is children, who may be poorly served
by an absence of educational programming"  or adversely affected by vio-
lent programming.9  It is reasonable  to  treat  the  resulting  problems  as
"externalities,"  but the more natural conclusion  is that the television  mar-
ket is creating difficulties  even in the absence of a market failure. Because
television has a significant role as an educational instrument, the failure  to
93.  Here, too, Baker has provided very illuminating discussions,  and I draw on his account.  See
Baker, supra  note 71, at 355-65.
94.  See  JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON  6-39 (1994).
95.  See MINOW  & LAMAY,  supra  note 50, at 15-65;  SUNSTEIN,  supra  note 68, at 53-92.
96.  See generally  SHANTO  IYENGAR,  Is  ANYONE  RESPONSIBLE?  How  TELEVISION  FRAMEs
PUBLIC  ISSUES  127-44  (1991);  SHANTO  IYENGAR  & DONALD  R.  KINDAR,  NEWS  THAT  MATTERS
(1987).
97.  DawaY, supra  note 58, at 207-08.
98.  See MINOW & LAMAY, supra  note 50, at 10-65.
99.  See HAMILTON, supra  note 45, at 76-128.
[Vol. 88:499TELEVISION AND  THE PUBLIC INTEREST
serve children is a significant problem,"  for children lack much ability and
much willingness to pay, and the result can be inadequate attention to their
needs.101 To be sure, some children do have willingness to pay in the sense
that they can pressure their parents to purchase  certain programming  and
the products that support it. But it is implausible to say that market criteria
exhaust the goals of a system of broadcasting  with respect to the interests
of children.
A well-functioning  market may also disserve people who are hearing
impaired, if they are deprived of access to television by the existing use of
technology. This is  a particular problem if they  are unable to watch the
news or to  understand  descriptions  of emergency  conditions.  Here  too
there is potential room for a regulatory response, partly in order to include
the hearing  impaired  in civic  activities  by informing  them of electoral
issues  and news  in general.  To  be sure,  some  people who  are  hearing
impaired  are willing to pay  for closed  captioning. But  such people face
serious  collective action problems in making their needs  and wishes clear
to advertisers and producers.  In any case, there is an important democratic
interest in ensuring that certain programming  is available to the hearing
impaired, quite  apart from their willingness  to pay. There is  thus strong
reason to support communications  policies  that promote the enfranchise-
ment of people with disabilities.
2.  Balkanization
Imagine that in a technological  future, each person could devise her
own preferred communications "menu";  imagine, in other words, that pro-
gramming could be fully, and not just partially, individuated. On economic
grounds, this would seem to be a striking advance, a guarantee of a kind of
optimality,  a victory for both freedom  and welfare. But from the demo-
cratic  standpoint, it is the stuff of science fiction, and it contains  serious
risks, above all because it may well result in a situation in which many or
most are not exposed to diverse views, but instead hear louder and louder
echoes of their own preexisting convictions." l  One of the advantages of a
well-functioning  system of freedom of expression is that it supplies one or
more genuinely  public spheres,  in which  diverse points  of view are  pre-
sented  and confront one another,  and are exposed to people who have a
willingness to learn. General-interest  newspapers  and magazines often do
precisely this, and it is important to make provision for multiple forums of
100.  See MiNow & LAMAY, supra  note 50, at 100-26.
101.  See iL; see also PsucE, supra  note 9,  at 192, 246.
102.  See  SHAPIRO,  supra note  2, at  105-32.  See  also  the discussion  of group  polarization in
Schkade et al.,  supra  note 62; Sunstein, supra  note 62.
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this kind. Insofar as they disregard this point, market conceptions of com-
munications miss a central matter.13
3.  Citizens, Consumers,  and Precommitment Strategies
The most important point is that a market system may fail to provide a
system of communication that is well-adapted to a democratic social order.
People  are  quite  aware  of this fact,  whatever they  may  choose in their
capacity as viewers and listeners; and they may, and often do, seek collec-
tive corrections. The problem with the economic approach is that it makes
private preferences normative, or decisive, for purposes of policy.
In short, there is  a pervasive difference between what people want in
their capacity as viewers  (or "consumers of broadcasting") and what they
want in their  capacity  as citizens."" °  Both preferences  and values  are  a
function of the setting in which people find themselves;  they are emphati-
cally a product of social role. ° 5 In these circumstances,  it would be wrong
to think that  the choices  of individual  viewers  are  definitive,  or defini-
tional, with respect to the question of what individuals really prefer. On the
contrary, a democratic public,  engaged in deliberation  about the world of
telecommunications,  may legitimately  seek regulations embodying aspira-
tions that diverge from their consumption choices.
Participants  in politics  may  be attempting  to promote their  meta-
preferences, or their preferences  about their own preferences. They may be
attempting to carry out a precommitment strategy of some kind. They may
be more altruistic or other-regarding  in their capacity  as citizens, perhaps
because of the nature of the goods involved. They may be more optimistic
about the prospects for change when acting collectively, and therefore able
to solve a collective  action problem faced in their individual capacities."6
In this  last respect,  the democratic  argument for departing from private
consumption choices  converges  with the argument emphasizing  the char-
acter of information as a public good.
When participants  in a democracy attempt to make things better and
do not simply track their consumption choices, it is not helpful to disparage
103.  See LEss1G, supra note 66, at 185-86.  See also  JORGEN HABERMAS,  BETWEEN  FACTS  AND
NoRms  362 (1996), emphasizing  that
[t]he diffusion of information and points  of view via effective broadcasting  media is not the
only  thing  that  matters  in  public  processes  of communication,  nor  it  is  the  most
important....  Mhe rules of a shared  practice of communication  are of greater significance
for structuring  public opinion. Agreement on issues and  contributions develops only  as the
result of more or less exhaustive  controversy in which proposals,  information,  and reasons
can be more or less rationally dealt with.
104.  A good discussion  is Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences,  Citizen Preferences,
and the Provision of  Public  Goods, 108  YALE LJ.  377 (1998).
105.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein,  Social Norms and Social Roles, 96  COLUM.  L. REv.  903,
906-17 (1996).
106.  The  latter  two points  are  emphasized  in  id.  at  944-46;  in the  particular  context  of
broadcasting, see Baker, supra  note 71, at 401-04.
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their efforts as "paternalism" or as "meddling." Their efforts at reform rep-
resent democracy in action."° e  It is entirely appropriate for government to
respond to people's aspirations and commitments as expressed in the pub-
lic realm. This is especially so when a democratic polity is itself attempting
to ensure more in the way of democratic deliberation.
4.  Endogenous Preferences
On the market view,  freedom  consists  in the  satisfaction of viewer
preferences,  whatever their content. But this is an inadequate conception  of
freedom.' °  It is important to ensure a degree of freedom in the formation
of preferences,  and not only in preference  satisfaction. If people's prefer-
ences are formed as a result of the existing arrangement, including limita-
tions  in  available  opportunities,  or  of exposure  to  a  limited  kind  of
television, then it makes no sense to say that the existing arrangement  can
be justified by reference to their preferences.
It seems clear that the public's "tastes,"  with respect to television pro-
gramming,  do not come from nature  or from  the sky. They are  partly  a
product of  current and  recent practices  by broadcasters  and other  pro-
grammers. They are often generated by the market."°  What people want, in
short, is partly a product of what they are accustomed to seeing. It is also a
product of existing social norms, which can change over time, and which
are themselves responsive to existing commercial  fare. Tastes are formed,
not just served, by broadcasters.
This point raises doubts about the idea that government policy should
simply take viewers'  tastes as given. In  an era in which broadcasters  are
providing a good deal of public interest programming, dealing with serious
issues in a serious way, many members of the public will cultivate a taste
for that kind of programming. This effect would promote democratic ideals
by disseminating information and helping to increase deliberation."  In an
era in which broadcasters  are carrying sensationalistic  or violent material,
members  of the public may well  cultivate  a taste for more of the same.
"Free marketeers  have little to cheer about if all they can claim is that the
market is efficient at filling desires that the market itself creates ....  Just as
culture affects preferences,  so also do markets influence culture."''  If this
is  so,  the ideal of consumer sovereignty  is placed  under some pressure;
market activities cannot easily be justified by reference to tastes that they
themselves generate.
107.  See Baker, supra  note 71, at 401-11.
108.  See generally  JOSEPH  RAZ,  THE  MORALITY  OF  FREEDOM  369-78  (1986)  (discussing social
preconditions for autonomy); AmARTYA  SEN,  COMMODITIEs AND  CAPABILITIES  (1985).
109.  See Baker, supra  note 71, at 404-10.
110.  For evidence that the effects of television on this count are far from fanciful,  see IYENGAR,
supra  note 96, at 26-116.
111.  FRANK&  CooK, supra note 23,  at201.
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This point should not be overstated.  Probably broadcasters  have lim-
ited power to push tastes very dramatically in one direction  or another. But
at a minimum, the idea that viewers'  tastes are endogenous  to existing fare
should be taken as a cautionary note about treating consumption choices as
decisive for purposes of policy. There is nothing illegitimate about policies
that depart from consumption choices  in favor of widely held social  aspi-
rations. But there is reason for broader concern about the adverse effects of
certain kinds of programming-including  a failure to cover serious issues
in a serious way--on democratic judgments.'
5.  Paternalism?  Elitism?
It might be tempting to respond that the arguments thus far are unac-
ceptably paternalistic,  indeed  elitist. If individual  listeners  and  viewers
prefer fare of a certain kind, how can  there be any grou'd for legitimate
complaint?  Perhaps children  pose a special  case,  but even here  parental
guidance is far from unusual. Why should government displace the choices
of adults, including parents, and substitute choices of its own?
Let us take the charge of paternalism  first. Notice that insofar as the
argument stresses a collective action problem faced by individual consum-
ers, paternalism is not at work at all. Notice too that insofar as the argu-
ment  centers  on  people's  desires  in  their  capacity  as  citizens,  no
paternalism is involved; the claim is that (a majority of) the people seek to
push consumption patterns in certain directions. This form of precommit-
ment strategy, or autopaternalism,  should not be confused with paternalism
of any objectionable  kind." 3 To  be  sure,  this  argument  depends  on  an
empirical proposition to the effect that in their capacity as citizens, people
would like a communications market of a certain kind." 4 But the proposi-
tion seems at the very least highly plausible.
To the extent that I have emphasized  the endogeneity  of preferences,
my argument might seem to verge on objectionable paternalism. Certainly
preferences are not being taken as given. But there is nothing objectionable
about insisting that in a democracy, free and equal citizens are entitled to a
public culture that will promote their freedom  and their equality. It is one
thing to say that a government  should not be authorized to overcome peo-
ple's judgments,  when those people are armed with adequate information.
It  is  quite  another  to say  that government  should  be permitted  to take
modest, viewpoint-neutral steps  to promote the operation of a democratic
order by, for example, ensuring free air time for candidates, or subsidizing
112.  See  IYENGAR,  supra note  96,  at 46-68  (discussing television news'  framing  of poverty,
unemployment, and racial inequality).
113.  See  JON  ELSTER,  ULYSSES  AND  THE  SIRENs  36-47  (1979)  (discussing  precommitment
strategies).
114.  Of course some such judgments would run afoul of the First Amendment-if, for example,
they involved a form of viewpoint discrimination.
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certain kinds of fare, or promoting  substantive  discussion  of substantive
questions. And the charge, indeed the very notion, of paternalism becomes
harder to understand when the preferences involved  are a product of the
very system whose legitimacy is at issue.
Nor is there anything unacceptably "elitist"  about a communications
policy that fosters education of children, and more substantive and diverse
coverage  of civic issues.  To  the extent  that substantive  programming  is
said to have special appeal for "elites" (a vague and empirically uncertain
claim), the problem lies not in a policy that encourages  such programming,
but in unjust background conditions,  and in particular, in unjust inequali-
ties in education. A communications policy that attempts to promote more
discussion and understanding of public issues is a partial way of overcom-
ing those unjust inequalities. It is not a way of catering to them.
To be sure, the charge of elitism would have force if programming
content were dictated by a political elite, promoting its own preferred fare
free from effective electoral control. It is crucial to the argument offered
here  that regulatory  strategies-from  the FCC or  from  Congress-are
subject to democratic supervision.  It is also crucial that any  effort to pro-
mote programming  of a certain kind is defended, not by the preferences  of
the regulators,  but by democratic values  that should, at least in principle,
meet with widespread public approval.  The judgment on behalf of delib-
erative democracy (and corresponding regulatory strategies) does not itself
come from the sky. Any view on its behalf depends, not on a claim that it
is extracultural, but on the arguments that are made on its behalf.
There  is  no  argument here  for any particular  conception  of public
interest broadcasting. A talk-show on racial violence may well be at least
as desirable, for democratic purposes,  as a public debate between  candi-
dates for public office. Staged and self-serving statements by politicians on
C-Span may not add more, and may add less, to public understanding than
(easily  imaginable) rock  or rap  music videos. The point of a  system of
public  service  broadcasting  would be  to encourage  those who  produce
television programming  to use their own creativity to promote deliberation
about public issues, not to force programming into any particular mode.
Of course public interest programming  will do  little good if people
simply  change  the  channel.  No  one  urges  that the  government  should
require people to watch governmentally preferred programming.  The only
suggestion is that if the government, responsive  as it is to citizen  aspira-
tions, seeks to ensure more public interest programming  than the market
does, there is no principled ground for complaint. In any case it is likely
that some people  would watch  the resulting programming  and develop  a
taste for it; that empirical probability is all that is necessary to vindicate the
suggestions made here.
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6.  Constitutional  Notes
This is not an Article about the First Amendment  or about constitu-
tional law; but it will be useful to conclude  this Section with some brief
notations on those subjects. From what has been said thus far, it should be
clear that  a central purpose  of the First Amendment  is to ensure  a well-
functioning democratic order."5 A system of free expression is designed in
large part to protect the preconditions  for a form  of sovereignty  that is
suited to genuine  self-governance.  It is not designed to protect whatever
happens to come out of the mouths,  or pens,  or word-processors  of those
who are attempting to speak. This view receives support on both historical
and philosophical grounds." 16
One implication is that government may well be permitted to regulate
speakers  who are not contributing to democratic deliberation-for  exam-
ple, those who advertise cigarettes. Another implication is that government
efforts  to promote  a  well-functioning  democratic  order  should  not be
invalidated even if they involve content regulation,  so long as there is no
discrimination  against any point of view. If government  seeks to ensure a
certain level of educational programming,  or if it allows free  air time for
candidates, or if it provides a right of access for those who attempt to speak
on political issues, it is not violating the free speech guarantee  merely by
virtue of the fact that it is intruding on the discretion of those who  own
stations. A conclusion to the contrary would convert the First Amendment
into  a  form of Herbert  Spencer's  Social Statics," 7  or at  least  Richard
Epstein's Simple Rules for A  Complex  World; 8  it would tear  the  First
Amendment from its theoretical underpinnings."9
On  this view of the First Amendment, there  is  no tension between
constitutionalism  and  democracy,  or  between  individual  rights  and
majority rule, properly understood; robust rights of free expression  are a
precondition for both democracy  and majority rule, properly understood. In
this way, private  autonomy is in no tension with, but is  on the contrary
inextricably  intertwined  with, the notion  of popular  sovereignty.'  The
point is not limited to freedom of speech. Protection  of private property,
for example,  can  be seen  as  a precondition of the status  of citizenship;
those whose holdings  depend  on the beneficent  exercise  of government
115.  See  ALEXANDER  MEIKLEJOHN,  FREE  SPEECH AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948);  SuNsTEiN, supra note 68, at 121-66.
116.  See generally HABERMAS,  supra note  18,  at 283-328  (discussing theory  of deliberative
democracy);  SUNSTEIN, supra note 68, at 241-50 (same).
117.  HERBERT SPENCER,  SOCIAL  STATICS (1913).
118.  EPSTEIN, supra note 8 (arguing for six simple rules of governance).
119.  None of this means that the First Amendment is only about democratic  self-government. It
has other purposes as well. See generally  SUNSTEIN,  supra  note 68, at 137-48.
120.  See JORGEN  HABERMAS,  THE INCLUSION  OF THE  OTHER 258-60  (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De
Greiff eds., 1998).
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discretion are hardly in a position to operate as independent citizens in the
public domain. And the protection against unreasonable searches  and sei-
zures,  and other abuses of authority by the police, are safeguards  of indi-
vidual liberty that simultaneously prevent attacks on popular sovereignty.
The account offered  here thus  provides  a basis for understanding  many
individual rights in a way that fuses the "freedom of the ancients"  and the
"freedom of the moderns."'
1 2
PRINCIPLE, POLICY,  TECHNOLOGY
These points suggest that there is good reason, in principle, for some
kind of regulatory response  to existing markets in television. But nothing
said thus far argues for any particular governmental initiative. There is no
simple  "match"  between the identifiable  market and  nonmarket  failures
and public  interest requirements  in  general.  For example,  it is hard  to
imagine  a legitimate  governmental  response to the problem of excessive
homogeneity on the major networks. We have also seen that existing pub-
lic interest obligations are extremely varied; each of them must be assessed
on its own.
At first glance, policies  that attempt to promote better programming
for children  are most securely  supported by the arguments  made thus far
(as a response to what is reasonably classified as a market failure, and also
as  a  way  of  increasing  positive  externalities  and  of  promoting
social aspirations). Efforts to ensure that hearing impaired people are able
to enjoy television,  through closed captioning,  are justifiable  on similar
grounds. There is room also for efforts to ensure better coverage  of elec-
toral campaigns-perhaps  through a requirement of free air time for candi-
dates,  perhaps  through  a  private  "code"  designed  to  ensure  more
substantive  discussion. Disclosure requirements,  allowing  the public to
have a general sense of broadcaster performance,  seem to be justified as a
nonintrusive method for allowing civic aspirations to help influence future
programming.  As a response to the possibly unfortunate effects  of adver-
tiser pressures, and also as a way of ensuring against a destructive "race to
the bottom" with respect to programming content, a general code of broad-
caster behavior seems appealing."
A.  Practice
There  are important pragmatic questions here. To say that a response
is justified in principle  is not at all to say that it will succeed  in practice.
Just as in the environmental area, where command-and-control  regulation
121.  Id. at 258.
122.  See discussion infra Part VI.
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has produced  unintended  adverse  consequences,123  many  problems  have
emerged with command-and-control regulation of the kind that has typified
FCC regulation for most of its history. Consider, for example, the fairness
doctrine, designed to ensure exposure to public issues and to allow diverse
voices to have access to the airwaves. A serious problem with the fairness
doctrine is that it appears to have discouraged stations from covering con-
troversial issues at all, thus ensuring  a kind of bland uniformity  that dis-
serves democratic goals.24 A uniform set of mandates  may also produce
waste and poor programming;  if a network is especially bad at generating
good shows  for children  and has a hard time attracting  a children's audi-
ence,  is  it  so  clear  that  that  network  should  be  faced  with  the  same
obligations  as everyone else? In view of the great diversity of the broad-
casting market, a "one-size-fits-all"  approach may be far more costly,  and
less effective, than creative alternatives.
It is useful to distinguish here between approaches that suppress mar-
kets  and  approaches  that  supplement  markets."u  Market-suppressing
approaches  include minimum wage and maximum hour laws, or price and
wage controls. Market-supplementing  approaches  include job-training pro-
grams and the earned income tax credit. In telecommunications  policy, the
fairness  doctrine  was  a market-suppressing  remedy;  so  too are  require-
ments that broadcasters provide three hours of educational  programming
per week, or a certain amount of time for candidates for public office. By
contrast, the grant of public funds to the Public Broadcasting System (PBS)
is a market-supplementing  approach; so too is a subsidy granted to each of
the networks, designed  to ensure a certain amount of public interest pro-
gramming. To be sure, the line between  the two approaches  can be  thin
when the market-supplementing  approach  ends up displacing material that
would  otherwise be  supplied  in  accordance  with  forces  of supply  and
demand.
B.  Communications Past,  Present,  and Future: Planned
Obsolescence and  Beyond
The arguments  offered thus  far have not specifically  addressed  the
new  market  in  communications.  An  especially  important  question  is
whether emerging  changes in television technology  should strengthen  sat-
isfaction with market outcomes.
123.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,  FREE MARKETS AND  SOCIAL JUSTICE 245-283 (1997).
124.  See Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness  Doctrine a "Chilling Effect"?
Evidence from the Postderegulation  Radio Market, 26 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  279  (1997)  (offering  an
affirmative answer to the question in the title).
125.  See DREZE & SEN, supra note 87, at 21-24 (discussing market supplementing strategies).
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1.  Predicting  the Future
Of course the most striking feature of the emerging  communications
market is a dramatic increase in the number of available  stations and pro-
gramming options. The existing regulatory regime was designed for a sys-
tem with  three private broadcasting  networks  and PBS.  In  1996,  about
thirty-five  percent of people who  had television remained dependent on
broadcasters,  which results in access to five or six stations.126 This means
that about two-thirds of viewers had access to between fifty and one hun-
dred  stations,  including  the all-news  stations C-SPAN and  CNN,  and a
range  of  "soft  news"  stations  such  as  MSNBC.  By  itself  this  is  an
extremely  significant  change,  and the shift from this  situation  to one in
which most people have access  to (say) 500 stations may be only one of
degree.
More dramatic innovations are coming in the future, with the possible
ultimate  "convergence"  of various  television  sources,  including  digital
television  and the Internet.'27 If a "television set" becomes akin to a com-
puter monitor that provides  access to the full range  of American  maga-
zines,  would not the case  for public  interest  regulation be substantially
weakened? The foregoing discussion offers an ambivalent answer. Some of
the problems with the market status quo would dissipate, but others  would
remain. Let us explore these questions in more detail.
For purposes of analysis,  we might separate  the market for television
into  four rough  stages.  The first  is the period  between  the  1940s  and
1970s-the market for which the existing regulatory system was designed;
call this the old regime. As noted, the old regime included three large net-
works  and also  PBS; the  four stations  provided  all  of what  Americans
knew  as television. The second market is  one of the 1990s;  call this the
transitional state. Here the most dramatic change is in the number of avail-
able options.  This  is a system in which  a substantial percentage  (about
thirty-five percent) of the viewing public relies on five broadcasters  and
PBS, but in which sixty-five percent of the public has access to cable tele-
vision,  and thus is able to choose  among fifty or more options."  Of that
sixty-five percent, a growing segment is able to see well over one hundred
stations. But in the transitional  state, broadcasters. continue to have a spe-
cial role, both because a substantial number of people do not have access to
cable at all, and because even cable viewers watch the major networks  dis-
proportionately.
The third stage, likely to begin shortly, is continuous with the transi-
tional state; call this the stage of multiple options. This will be a market in
which  broadcasters  will continue  to be seen by more people than  other
126.  See U.S.  BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,  supra note 65.
127.  See OWEN, supra note 3, at 327-33.
128.  See U.S.  BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,  supra note 65.
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providers,  but they will become decreasingly  distinctive in terms of both
the  size  and  the nature  of their audience.  Even more  people  will  have
access  to cable or other options,  and many of those  who rely on broad-
casting  will be able to have more options too. But broadcasters  will con-
tinue to be seen by a disproportionate number of people, if only because a
shrinking but still substantial percentage of viewers will continue to have
access only to broadcasters;  this significant  subgroup is important partly
because of its sheer size and partly because it includes an especially  high
percentage  of people, including  children, who  are poor and poorly edu-
cated. In this stage, broadcasters  will in some ways be akin to Newsweek,
Time, and U.S. News & World Report, in the sense that they will have a
relatively dominant role in terms of sheer numbers. But they will have to
compete  with  other programmers,  some general,  some  specialized,  with
analogues  (most of them now  in place on cable  or even the Internet) to
Sports Illustrated, The Economist, Dog Fancy, National  Review, National
Geographic, The New Republic,  Consumer Reports, Playboy, and many
more.  This third  stage will be marked  by  the rise of digital  television,
which  is  allowing broadcasters  to "multiplex,"  that is, to provide  two,
three,  four, or even five programs  where they  could previously  provide
only one. The result may be to make broadcasters  themselves more spe-
cialized.129 It is hard to speculate about the future, but the best prediction is
that a situation of this kind will prevail for the next decade and more.
The final stage-call it one of technological convergence-is  one of
substantial or possibly even complete  shrinkage in the distinctive role  of
broadcasters. 30  This will be a stage in which television programming  can
be provided via the Internet, over telephone lines, or both; a television, or
one kind of television, may itself be a simple computer monitor, connected
to various programming  sources from which viewers may make selections.
If it is economically feasible for broadcasters  to continue as such, they are
unlikely  to have a special role and will be among  a large number of pro-
viders. At most, and extending the analogy to Time or Newsweek,  they will
have  a  somewhat  larger  and more  general  audience  than  most  of their
competitors;  perhaps  they  will  be  entertainment  conglomerates  with
multiple stations and programs. Perhaps they will not be distinctive at all.'
The most extreme version of this final  stage would be akin to the market
for books, in which people make individual choices, usually not filtered by
an intermediary offering packages.
1
12
129.  See id. at 100.
130.  This shrinkage may or may not occur as  a result of convergence. For discussion, see id. at
329.
131.  This speculation is questioned in OWEN,  supra  note  3, at 328-33,  and Goldberg et al., supra
note 5, at 296.
132.  I put to one side the complexities introduced by Amazon.corn and various book clubs.
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2.  Regulatory Options and Technological Change
All of the arguments  offered thus far-about market and nonmarket
failures-make  sense for the old regime and the transitional  state. They
also seem to make sense for the emerging third stage of multiple options;
recall that even here, a substantial  segment of the public will  depend on
broadcasters  only, and people with access to cable  and other alternatives
continue,  statistically  speaking,  to watch  a disproportionate  amount  of
broadcast fare. But arguments for public interest obligations would be less
sensible  as applied  to a market in which broadcasters  occupy no special
role, partly because some of the relevant problems  would be diminished,
partly because in such a market it seems peculiar to impose on broadcast-
ers, and no one else, a special duty to protect public interest goals. In that
market, perhaps  every  station  should be faced with some of the require-
ments discussed below (in particular, the disclosure requirement).  But the
case for other requirements  (such as uniform mandates, a broadcaster-only
code, or "play or pay") would be greatly weakened, not least since it would
seem arbitrary to single out broadcasters for such requirements.
Let us examine, in more detail, the force of the particular arguments
as the market changes over time. Even if informational influences produce
a degree of homogeneity  among broadcasters,  and even  if broadcasters
tend to follow one another, the increasing number of channels means that
for most Americans, there is far more heterogeneity now than there was a
decade ago, and a great deal more heterogeneity is likely in the near future,
probably dramatically  increasing heterogeneity.  At the same time, adver-
tisers are likely to have an increasingly  weak role in determining overall
programming  content.  When  a  few  broadcasters  exhaust  the  market,
advertiser preferences could have a more substantial effect than they now
do. Thus, two of the arguments made above-involving the market failures
resulting  from advertiser  pressures  and informational cascades-are  sig-
nificantly weakened.133
But some of the arguments  offered above-especially  those focused
on democratic ideals-retain  considerable  force. Even  in the very long
term,  there  will  continue  to  be  substantial  external  benefits  from
public  interest programming,  benefits  that  are not adequately  captured
by  individual  viewer  choices.  And to  the  extent  that citizens  seek  to
push  communications  policy  toward  (for  example)  more  and  better
programming for children, or free air time for candidates, or greater access
for  the  hearing  impaired,  changes  in  the  evolving  market  offer  only
partial  answers.  Heterogeneity  may  be  an  inadequate  solution  here.  It
133.  Of course  these  changes  should  not be overstated.  Recall  that 32 percent  of American
households with televisions still lack cable television, and that a substantial number of Americans  are
likely to  depend on  over-the-air programming  for the not-too-distant  future;  hence, the  increasing
heterogeneity  is not quite as dramatic as it might seem.
2000]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
is reasonable for citizens to believe that there should be very general public
exposure to public issues, and that it is not sufficient to have one, or two,
or three, or even more stations  (CNN, C-SPAN,  MSNBC) that take such
issues seriously. Indeed,  citizens may favor a kind of general precommit-
ment strategy-operating  against their own particular viewing  choices-
through which broadcasters, at least, are required to devote some time to
educational  or civic programming.  Thus, the presence  of news-only  sta-
tions,  especially  on cable,  is not a sufficient response  to those who want
broadcasters  to do more and better. It is insufficient partly because  a sig-
nificant segment of the population will have no access  to cable at all,  and
partly because  in their capacity  as  citizens, people  may favor a precom-
mitment strategy that favors certain public interest goals.
In the very long run, this argument too will be weakened. As we have
seen, the strongest objection would come when broadcasters  are no longer
genuinely  distinctive;  when  this  is  the  case,  it will  seem  arbitrary  to
encourage  broadcasters,  but not others,  to provide  certain kinds  of pro-
gramming.  In the face of such changes, it will indeed make sense to adapt
the proposals discussed below to this dramatically  altered market. But it is
hard to explore this question in the abstract; everything  turns on the par-
ticular regulatory proposal that is at issue.
The question of adaptation will arise at several points below. For now
let us observe  only that in the extreme  situation-when  broadcasters  are
not in any sense distinctive-the case for regulation limited to broadcasting
would be very weak, and alternative strategies, involving funding of public
interest programming,  would be better. Thus, my emphasis here-on dis-
closure, economic incentives,  and voluntary  self-regulation-is  designed
for a (likely not inconsiderable) period in which broadcasters  continue  to
occupy a special role. To simplify a complex story, the very long-term may
call for a combination  of public subsidies  for high-quality  programming
and disclosure requirements for general-interest stations. But in the shorter
term, there is a great deal more to consider. And it is important to see that
in the long-term much may be lost, as well as gained, with  a highly bal-
kanized communications  system in which many people are not exposed  to
serious programming, many others simply hear echoes of their own voices,
and widely shared viewing experiences become rarer."
There is a large issue in the background here:  how to define the mar-
ket from which to assess proposals for public interest requirements. Tradi-
tionally,  "television  broadcasting"  has  been  viewed  as  the  relevant
category, but skeptics might well ask why the real category is not "sources
of information and entertainment."  If that category  were the relevant one,
there might seem to be no problem calling for requirements  at all-not in
the  1930s, not in the  1950s, not in the 1970s,  not in the  1990s, and not in
134.  See Lessig, supra  note 66, at 185-86.
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the foreseeable future. The traditional approach seems best defended on the
ground that television has a special role and salience; if this is no longer
true, a particular regulatory regime,  limited to television, loses its ration-
ale.'35 The best argument for the future is that even if television as a whole
is far from the only  source of information and entertainment,  it continues
to have a distinctive social role, and efforts to promote the goals associated
with public interest programming might do considerable good.
IV
DISCLOSURE
Consider a simple proposal:  broadcasters  should be required to dis-
close, in some detail and on a quarterly basis, all of their public service and
public interest activities.  The  disclosure might include  an  accounting  of
any free air time provided to candidates, educational programming,  chari-
table  activities,  programming  designed  for  traditionally  under-served
communities,  closed captioning for the hearing impaired,  local program-
ming, and public service announcements." 6 The hope, vindicated by expe-
rience with similar approaches in environmental law, 37 is that a disclosure
requirement will by itself trigger improved performance, by creating a kind
of competition to do better, and by enlisting various social pressures in the
direction of improved performance.  A requirement of this  sort would be
part of a general trend in federal regulation, one with considerable prom-
ise.1
38
A.  Precursors
Many statutes and regulations now require the disclosure of informa-
tion. Some of these are designed to assist consumers in making informed
choices;  such statutes are meant to be market-enhancing. By contrast, oth-
ers are  designed  to trigger  political rather than  market safeguards;  such
statutes  are  meant to enhance  democratic  processes.  The most  famous
of these  is  the National  Environmental  Policy  Act (NEPA).1 39  Enacted
in 1972, the principal goal of NEPA is to require the government to com-
pile and disclose environmentally-related  information before  the govern-
ment  goes  forward  with  any  projects  having  a  major  effect  on  the
135.  But  see BOLLINGER,  supra note 7, defending  two competing  regulatory  regimes,  one for
television and one for the print media.
136.  See FINAL REPORT, supra note  19, at 104-05, for an illustration.
137.  See  Madhu  Khanna et  al.,  Toxics Release  Information:  A  Policy  Tool for Environmental
Protection, 36 J. ENVTL.  EcoN. & M  mT. 243 (1998).
138.  See  vESLEY A. MAGAT  & W. Kip Viscusi,  INFORMATIONAL  APPROACHES TO REGULATION
(1992)  (discussing possible effectiveness of disclosure); Sunstein, supra  note 24, at 618-29 (discussing
this trend).
139.  42 U.S.C.  §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
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environment.1"  NEPA  does not require the government  to give  environ-
mental effects  any particular weight, nor is there judicial review of the sub-
stance of agency  decisions. 141  The purpose  of disclosure is principally  to
trigger political safeguards,  coming from the government's own judgments
or from external pressure. Governmental  indifference  to adverse environ-
mental effects  is perfectly  acceptable  under NEPA:  the idea behind  the
statute is that if the public is not indifferent, the government will have to
give some weight to environmental effects.
Probably the most successful experiment in information disclosure is
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know  Act (EPCRA). 1 42
Under this statute, firms and individuals must report to state and local gov-
ernment the quantities of potentially hazardous  chemicals  that have been
stored  or released into  the environment.  On the basis  of the relevant
results, the EPA publishes pollution data about the releases of over 300
chemicals from over 20,000 facilities."  This has been an exceptional  suc-
cess  story, one that has well exceeded  expectations  at the time of enact-
ment.14  A  detailed  report  suggests  that  EPCRA  has  had  important
beneficial effects,  spurring  innovative, cost-effective  programs from the
EPA and from state and local government.146
Many other statutes involving health,  safety, and the environment fall
into the category of information disclosure measures. The Animal Welfare
Act 47 is designed partly to ensure publicity about the treatment of animals;
thus covered research facilities and dealers are required to file reports with
the government about their conduct, with the apparent goal that the reports
will deter  noncompliance  and  also  allow  continuing  monitoring.'  In
addition to its  various  command-and-control  provisions,  the Clean  Air
Act 1 49 requires  companies to create and disclose "risk management plans"
involving accidental releases  of chemicals; the plans must include a worst-
case scenario."  The  Safe Drinking Water Act"' was amended in  1996 to
140.  See Calvert Cliffs'  Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.  1971).
141.  See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood  Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,227-28 (1980).
142.  42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
143.  See id  §  11023.
144.  See HAMILTON, supra  note 45, at 302.
145.  See  ROBERT  V.  PERCIVAL  ET AL.,  ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION:  LAW,  SCIENCE,  AND
POLICY 612-16  (2d ed.  1996)  (discussing informational approaches);  James  T. Hamilton,  Exercising
Property  Rights to Pollute: Do Cancer  Risks and Politics  Affect Plant  Emission  Reductions, 18 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY  105,  106-08  (1999)  (discussing success of toxic release  inventory);  Khanna et al.,
supra note  137,  at 243 (discussing  success of toxic release inventory  and stockholder  responses  to
release of relevant information).
146.  See U.S.  GENERAL  ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  TOXIC CHEmicALs  (1991)  (report to Congress).
147.  7 U.S.C.  §§ 2131-2159 (1994).
148.  See id  §§ 2140,2142.
149.  42 U.S.C.  §§ 7401-7671  (1994).
150.  Id  § 7412(r).
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require annual  "consumer  confidence  reports"  to be developed  and dis-
seminated by community water suppliers. 1 52 Statutes governing  discrimi-
nation and  medical  care  also  seem  committed  partly  to the  idea  that
"sunlight is the best of disinfectants"; 53 thus they require covered institu-
tions to compile reports  about their conduct and compliance  with applica-
ble  law.  The  Federal  Election  Campaign  Act"M  requires  political
committees to disclose a great deal of information about their activities.
Of course  there  is  an  overlap  between  informational  regulation
designed to assist consumers and informational regulation designed to trig-
ger political checks. A statute that requires companies to place "eco-labels"
on their products may produce little in the way of consumer response, but
shareholders  and participants  in the democratic  process  may  attempt to
sanction those companies whose labels reveal environmentally  destructive
behavior.  Companies  will know  this  in advance,  with likely behavioral
consequences.  The  risk  of  sanctions  from  shareholders  and  state
legislatures may well produce environmental  improvement even without
regulation.
A great deal of recent attention has been given to informational regu-
lation  in the particular  context  of the communications  industry.  As  an
alternative  to  direct  regulation,  which  raises  especially  severe  First
Amendment problems, the government might attempt to increase informa-
tion instead. Thus, the mandatory "v-chip" is intended to permit parents to
block programming that they want to exclude from their homes; the v-chip
is supposed  to work hand-in-hand  with a ratings system. 1 5 5  Similarly,  a
provision of the 1996 Telecommunications  Act requires television manu-
facturers  to  include  technology  capable  of reading  a  program  rating
mechanism; requires the FCC to create a ratings methodology if the indus-
try does not produce an acceptable  ratings plan within a year; and requires
that broadcasters include a rating in their signals if the relevant program is
rated. 56 Spurred by this statute, the networks have generated a system for
television ratings, which is now in place. 157 The question is whether disclo-
sure requirements might be enlisted more generally.
B.  Rationale
Why has information  disclosure become  such  a popular  regulatory
tool? There  are several answers. For various reasons,  a market failure may
151.  42 U.S.C. §  300g (1994).
152.  42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4) (Supp. II 1996).
153.  The phrase comes from Louis D. BRANDEIS,  OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
154.  2 U.S.C. § 441a-411h (1994).
155.  See HAMILTON,  supra  note 45, at 289-92.
156.  See Telecommunications  Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,  § 551,  110  Stat.  56; see also
HAILTON, supra  note 45, at 302.
157.  See § 551, 110 Stat. at 141-42.
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come  in  the  form  of an  inadequate  supply  of information.5'  Because
information is  generally'59  a public good-something  that if provided  to
one is also provided to all or many-workers  and consumers may attempt
to free ride on the efforts of others, with the result that too little informa-
tion is provided. For this reason, compulsory disclosure of information can
provide the simplest and most direct response to the relevant market fail-
ure.
Information disclosure is often a far less expensive and more efficient
strategy  than  command-and-control,  which  consists  of rigid  mandates
about regulatory  ends  (a  certain  percentage reduction  in sulfur  dioxide
emissions,  for example),  regulatory means  (a technological  mandate, for
example,  for  cars),  or  both."6  A  chief  advantage  of  informational
regulation is its comparative  flexibility. If consumers  are informed of the
salt and sugar content of foods, they can proceed as they wish, trading off
various product characteristics  however they  see fit. If workers are given
information about the risks posed by their workplace, they can trade safety
against other possible variables  (such as salary, investments for children or
retirement,  and leisure). 6' If viewers  know the content of television pro-
grams in advance, they can use market methods (by refusing to watch) or
political methods (by complaining to stations) to induce changes. From the
standpoint  of efficiency,  information remedies  can be better than either
command-and-control  regulation or reliance on markets alone.
From the democratic  point of view, informational regulation  also has
substantial advantages. A well-functioning  system of deliberative  democ-
racy requires a certain degree of information so that citizens can engage in
their monitoring  and deliberative  tasks.  Subject  as they are  to parochial
pressures,  segments of the government may have insufficient incentives to
disclose information  on their own; consider the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)62  or the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),1 63 designed
to counteract the self-interest of government or private groups, which may
press in the direction of too little disclosure. A good way to enable citizens
to oversee private or public action, and  also to assess  the  need for less,
more, or different regulation,  is to inform them of both private and public
158.  See ANTHONY  OGUS,  REGULATION:  LEGAL FORM  AND ECONOMIC THEORY  121-25 (1994).
159.  Of course  it  is  possible  to  give  information  more  "private  good"  characteristics,  and
innovative approaches  can be expected in the next decade. Consider, for example, fees for access to
information  on the Internet, or the subscription-based  Consumer Reports; neither of these approaches
converts information  into a private good, but both reduce the range of people  who may, without high
cost, have access  to it. It is possible to imagine a range of approaches  that would diminish the cost of
access for some while increasing it, or holding it constant, for others.
160.  See OGUS, supra note 158, at 121-49.
161.  See SUNSTEIN,supra note  123, at 329-30.
162.  5 U.S.C.  § 552 (1994).
163.  2 U.S.C.  § 441a-441h (1994).
[V/ol. 88:499TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC  INTEREST
activity.  The very fact that the public will be in a position to engage in
general monitoring may well be a spur to desirable outcomes.
EPCRA is the most obvious example here. Sharp, cost-effective, and
largely unanticipated reductions in toxic releases have come about without
anything in the way of direct regulation."6  One of the causes appears to be
adverse effects on stock prices from repeated  disclosure of high levels of
toxic releases.'  In the area of broadcasting, it is possible to hope that dis-
closure of public interest programming,  and the mere need to compile the
information  each  year, can  increase  educational  and public  affairs pro-
gramming without involving government mandates at all. A primary virtue
of informational regulation is that it triggers political safeguards and allows
citizens  a continuing oversight role, one that is, in the best cases, largely
self-enforcing.
None of this is to say that informational regulation is always effective
or desirable.  Under  imaginable  assumptions,  such regulation  would be
much less effective than command-and-control  regulation and much more
expensive  than  reliance  on  markets  unaccompanied  by  disclosure
requirements.  Sometimes informational strategies cost more than they are
worth,  and may be ineffectual  or even counterproductive.  Whether these
are convincing  objections  depends  on the incentives  faced by those who
disclose,  and these incentives are likely  to differ with context. Undoubt-
edly, the most successful cases of disclosure involve well-organized groups
able to impose reputational  and financial harm on those engaged in harm-
ful activity."
C.  The Minimal Proposal
We are now in a position to discuss a disclosure requirement for pub-
lic interest programming  in somewhat more detail.  On a quarterly basis,
every broadcaster should be required to make public the full range of pub-
lic interest and public service activities  in which it has engaged. The rele-
vant  activities  might  involve  free  air time  for  candidates,  educational
programming,  public service announcements,  access  for disabled viewers
(as through closed captioning or video descriptions),  charitable  activities,
emergency  warnings  and services,  and the like. The FCC should require
completion  of a relatively  simple form  to ensure  accurate  and uniform
accounting,  and FCC staff should sanction those stations that have failed to
disclose, or that have done so inaccurately.
A special advantage of disclosure requirements  is that they appear to
fit well with the emerging  communications  market insofar as they  allow
maximum flexibility and do not impose requirements  that may be rapidly
164.  See PERCIvAL ET AL., supra  note  145, at 611-16.
165.  See Khanna et al., supra  note 137, at 243.
166.  See GUNNINGHAM  ET AL., supra  note 20, at 296-300.
2000]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
outrun by changing  technologies. Even in a period in which broadcasters
are akin to Time and Newsweek,  such requirements  would  make a good
deal  of sense  as  a  means  of creating  some  democratic  pressure  for
improvement.67  Of course  it is reasonable  to think  that,  as  the market
evolves, disclosure requirements should be placed on all programmers, and
not be limited to broadcasters.  The hope-based  on good results  in the
environmental context-would be that such requirements would produce a
kind of "race,"  at least in some markets,  to do more and better.
D.  Of  Realism and  Ineffectiveness
Is the hope realistic? People did not anticipate that the Toxic Release
Inventory (TRI)65  would by itself spur behavioral changes;  the question is
whether  the  same forces  might  operate  here.  The  answer  depends  on
whether the mechanisms that have produced significant voluntary changes
in the environmental arena will also be triggered in this setting.
In order for voluntary improvements  to occur, the disclosure require-
ments must be accompanied by political activity or existing norms that will
increase  public  interest programming.  With  respect  to the  TRI,  well-
organized groups have been able  to threaten, or to use, publicity  so as to
induce  companies  to  undertake  voluntary  reductions.  Environmental
groups have mobilized  when disclosure shows high levels of toxic emis-
sions;  anticipating this,  companies have reduced emissions  voluntarily.'69
Thus, the effect of the TRI has been to draw private and perhaps  govern-
mental attention  to the most serious polluters, who have  an incentive  to
reduce on their own. Once this process is underway, there has been a kind
of competition to produce  further reductions,  as each polluter seeks  to be
substantially below the group of most serious polluters.
The question is whether  the same might  happen  here.  The answer
depends first on the existence of external  monitoring  and second  on the
167.  An  obvious  question is whether, if the case  for disclosure  has been  made  out,  similar
requirements ought to be imposed on magazines and even newspapers. Indeed, the same question might
be asked about economic incentives and voluntary self-regulation,  as discussed below. I do not discuss
these  questions  here.  For those  who  believe  that  there is  increasingly  little  difference  between
television and print media, it might seem that if  requirements of this sort are not desirable for the latter,
they are also undesirable  for the former. The best response to this argument  is in  BOLLINGER,  supra
note 7, at 85, with the suggestion that the different regulatory regimes for the broadcast and print media
are well-suited to  two different  images  of press  freedom,  one image  involving  democratic  self-
government, the other involving a form of economic laissez-faire. Bollinger believes that the existence
of two parallel regulatory regimes makes  appropriate space  for each of these  images, and that if one
regulatory regime goes wrong (through, for example, excessive regulation of television, or an excessive
"race to the bottom" in magazines), the other can serve as a corrective.  See id. at 128-32. This Article is
in  the general  spirit  of Bollinger's  approach,  but  it attempts  to develop  more  flexible  tools  for
implementing it, tools that are better adapted to the emerging television market.
168.  42 U.S.C. §  11023 (Supp. 1m1997).
169.  See  PERCIVAL  ET.  AL.,  supra note  145,  at  612-16; Hamilton,  supra note  145,  at  106-19;
Khanna et. aL, supra  note 137, at 243-44.
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power of the monitors to impose reputational  or financial harm on broad-
casters  with poor records. 10  The external  monitors  may  include  public
interest groups  seeking to "shame"  badly performing  broadcasters;  they
may include rivals who seek to create a kind of "race to the top." From the
disclosures, it should be clear which broadcasters  are doing least to pro-
mote the public interest, and perhaps those broadcasters  will be specially
targeted by private groups  and competitors. The ultimate effect cannot be
known a priori. If public  interest organizations,  and  viewers  who favor
certain programming, are able to mobilize, perhaps in concert with certain
members  of  the  mass  media,  substantial  behavioral  effects  might be
expected. It is even possible that a disclosure requirement would help cre-
ate its own monitors.
These are analogies between environmental disclosure and disclosure
of public interest activities, but there are important differences  as well. It is
possible that toxic releases are such a salient and easily quantified public
"bad"  that a political response is quite likely; perhaps a failure to provide
public interest programming is a far less salient "bad."  An announcement
that a certain company has emitted a certain level of toxic pollutants  may
produce  a  rapid  public  outcry  and  considerable  media  attention;  an
announcement that a certain station has failed to provide free air time for
candidates  may be met with public indifference, even a yawn. Partly this is
because acts seem worse than omissions (whatever the conceptual difficul-
ties with making  the distinction). Partly this is because the harmful effects
of toxic pollution seem serious and real in the abstract, a point that is far
less clear with a particular station's refusal  to provide  programming  for
children. The harmful effects of that refusal might be mitigated by the fact
that programming  for children  is available  on other stations,  and indeed
any problems caused, or not solved, by profit-seeking television companies
might well  be remedied  by other  sources  (newspapers,  magazines,  the
Internet). These points suggest that information disclosure may well work
better in the environmental  context, in which the nature and extent of the
problem make public concern far more likely.
In short, companies are responsive to economic incentives, as well as
to existing  social norms. Information  disclosure works best when market
pressures,  or political pressures,  are  likely to result in significant costs
for those whose performance  is poor. In the environmental context, disclo-
sure  strategies  have  worked  well  when  companies  have  feared  their
consequences.7  In the context of television, the risk is that disclosure will
have no effects at all-a purely symbolic measure. Indeed, the very collec-
tive action problems that argue for public service obligations raise the pos-
sibility that an information system will be quite ineffectual.
170.  See GUtNINGHAm'  ET AL.,  supra  note 20, at 296-300; Khanna et al., supra  note 137, at 243.
171.  See GUNMNGHAI  ET AL.,  supra  note 20, at 68-69.
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But in view of the relative unintrusiveness  of a disclosure require-
ment, and the flexibility of any private responses, this approach is certainly
worth  trying. At worst,  little  will be lost. At most,  something  will  be
gained, probably in the form of better programming  and greater informa-
tion about the actual performance  of the broadcasting industry-and  also
about the circumstances in which disclosure requirements will be effective
on their own. In light of the aspirations of most viewers, the possible result
of disclosure  will be to improve  the quality  and  quantity of both educa-
tional and civic programming in a way that promotes the goals  of a  well-
functioning deliberative democracy.  The most effective system of disclo-
sure would work in concert with well-organized  advocacy groups  willing
to publicize poor performance  and to bring general attention to those who
do both worst and best.
V
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
In this Part, I explore the possibility that broadcasters might meet their
public interest responsibilities, not through a set of uniform requirements,
but through economic incentives.  As  we will  see, the most creative  and
promising approach, modeled  on recent environmental  reforms,  involves
"play or pay," in which broadcasters are given a choice between complying
with public  interest requirements  or paying  someone  else  to put public
interest programming on the air. I begin with a discussion of "play or pay,"
and then move to a more ambitious treatment of the alternatives,  growing
out of the law of tort, and posing a debate between market-suppressing and
market-supplementing approaches.
A.  Of  Nature and Coase
Ronald Coase's work on efficiency, free trades, and  transaction costs
originated in the area of communications,  and in particular, in an attack on
the FCC; but it has been most influential in the environmental  arena.'  In
that area, there has been a great deal of dissatisfaction  with rigid govern-
mental commands,  and there has also been an unmistakable movement in
the direction of more flexible economic instruments, which are likely to be
far more efficient.'73 A command might say, for example,  that every coal-
fired power plant must reduce its sulfur dioxide emissions by fifty percent,
or that it must use technology  of a governmentally  specified kind. With
respect to environmental protection, incentives  typically come in two dif-
ferent forms:  pollution fees, imposed on those who produce environmental
172.  See R.H. Coase, The Market  for Goods and the Market  for Ideas, 64 AM.  ECON. REV.  PAPERS
& PRoc. 384 (1974),reprinted in R.H. COASE,  ESSAYS ON  ECONOMICS AND  ECONOMISTS  64 (1994);  see
also R.H. Coase, supra note 65.
173.  See GUNNINGHAM  ET AL., supra note 20, at 391-421.
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harm,  and tradeable pollution right or "licenses,"  given to those who pro-
duce pollution. Under the pollution fee model, the government  might say
that companies  must pay a certain amount per unit of sulfur dioxide emis-
sion. Under the tradeable pollution right model, the government might say
that each company is permitted to emit a certain specified amount of sulfur
dioxide, but that its permission, or right, can be bought and sold on the free
market. In the former model, it pays to reduce pollution simply in order to
reduce the level of the tax. In the latter model, it also pays to reduce pollu-
tion because the reduction can be used to engage  in more of the relevant
activity or in order to obtain money from another who  cannot reduce  so
cheaply. Fees or tradeable licenses should create good dynamic incentives
for pollution reduction,  and also move  environmental  protection  in the
direction of greater cost-effectiveness. 74
There is a complex literature on the choice between pollution fees and
tradeable  emission rights. 175  The solution  depends largely  on  an inquiry
into what the government knows and does not know.'76  In general,  a fee is
better if the government is  able to calculate  the damage done per unit of
pollution but has difficulty in calculating the appropriate aggregate  pollu-
tion level. In those circumstances,  a fee is better because the government is
unlikely to err in setting it, whereas a system of tradeable permits will pro-
duce mistakes. By contrast, a tradeable permit is better if the government
knows the appropriate aggregate  level, but is unable  to calculate the dam-
age done per unit of pollution. In either case, the government can capitalize
on the informational  advantage held by private businesses participating in
pollution control,  so as to allow them to decide on the most effective, least
expensive method of achieving any particular pollution reduction. If, under
a system of pollution fees,  it is extremely  expensive  for Company A  to
reduce  its current level, it may choose to pay a high tax. If the system is
one of tradeable pollution rights, it may simply pay someone else, capable
of reducing  pollution  more  cheaply,  to  produce  the  relevant reduction
instead. For any desired level of reduction,  a system of economic incen-
tives should produce the right result at a lower cost, by allocating burdens
to those most able to bear them.
B.  Taxes, Public Bads, Hot Potatoes, and Cold Spots
Although the FCC has experimented  with allocating communications
rights  via  auction,  little  thought  has  been  given  to  the  possibility  of
using  economic  incentives  to  promote  public  interest  goals  in  the
174.  See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL  &  WALLACE  E. OATES,  THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY
177 (2d ed. 1988).
175.  For an  overview,  see  Richard H. Pildes  & Cass  R. Sunstein,  Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv.  1, 72-85 (1995).
176.  See STEPHEN BREYER,  REGULATION  AN]  ITS REFORM 271-83  (1982).
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communications market. In principle, however, both the fees approach and
the license approach may well be preferable to government commands.  At
least this  is  so if we think of public interest  programming  as  a "good,"
which people should pay for failing to produce, just as pollution is a "bad,"
which people  should pay  for producing.  Consider educational  program-
ming and free time for presidential elections.  Suppose, for example,  that
ABC is in an especially  good position to produce high-quality program-
ming for children, whereas  CBS is in an especially good position to pro-
mote high-quality programming  involving presidential  elections.  Rather
than requiring both ABC and CBS  to produce educational programming
and programming  involving presidential  elections,  the government  might
allow each to pay a fee, or a tax, if it is to be relieved of the requirement  of
providing one or the other. This is the "tax"  model of public interest pro-
gramming. Alternatively, the government might adopt the tradeable emis-
sion  right  model,  and  allow  CBS  to  sell  ABC  its  obligation  with
respect to educational programming, while permitting ABC to sell CBS its
obligation with respect to presidential elections.
A large problem with a tax is that it is very hard to calculate. Should
the government use market measures of some kind, or attempt to measure
the public loss, or lost public gain, from the broadcasters'  behavior? Either
approach  would  be quite  difficult.  In these circumstances,  the  simplest
approach would be for the government  to experiment with "play or pay"
approaches, in which broadcasters have a presumptive  obligation  to pro-
vide public  service  programming  but  can buy  their way  out by paying
someone else to provide that programming instead. Such approaches  have
had considerable  success  in the environmental  area, despite  a number of
familiar reservations."7  People have objected, for example, that emissions
trading will make  an unfortunate  "statement"  about pollution,  thus legiti-
mizing it,78  or that trading will result in the concentration  of pollution in
dangerous "hot spots,1 1 79  or that the administrative  burdens  of a trading
system are overwhelming.'  Practice has generally shown these objections
to  be  unconvincing.'  If  there  is  an  analogy  between  environmental
protection and broadcasting regulation,'  a system in which those who  do
not provide public interest programming must pay a kind of "fee" has  an
important advantage, because it is so much more flexible than one in which
the government imposes uniform obligations on everyone. In this respect, a
177.  See Robert N. Stavins,  What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons
from SO2 Allowance Trading, J. ECON. PEERP., Summer 1998,  at 69.
178.  See  STEVEN  KELMAN,  WHAT  PRICE INCENTIVES?:  ECONOMISTS  AND  THE  ENVIRONMENT
110-65 (1981).
179.  See Stavins, supra note 177, at 82.
180.  See id.  at 80.
181.  See id. at 79-82.
182.  See HAMILTON, supra  note 45, at 285-322, for an instructive discussion.
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system of "play or pay" seems to be the most cost-effective means of pro-
moting public  interest goals, just as emissions  trading is  the most cost-
effective means  of reducing pollution. For those who  dislike it, a public
interest obligation  can be treated as  a kind of "hot potato";  fortunately,
from their point of view, it is one that they can transfer to others, as a gift
accompanied by cash.
It is possible to respond,  as  has been  conventionally  thought,  that
public interest responsibilities are a general part of the public trust and not
alienable,  and that broadcasters should not be permitted to "buy their way"
out of those  obligations.  But it is unclear  what  content  to give  to this
statement;  the question is what concrete harm would be created by a right
to  "pay"  rather than  "play."  If the  "play  or pay"  option had  corrosive
effects on the norms of the broadcasting  industry, by making people  take
public responsibilities  less seriously,  that would indeed be a problem;  but
there is little reason to believe that the option would have this effect. The
simple question is this:  What if a broadcaster were willing to give ten mil-
lion dollars to PBS in return for every minute, or every thirty seconds,  of
relief from  a public  interest responsibility?  At first glance,  the  nation
would be better off as a result, simply because the result would be to pro-
vide  the  same level  of public interest broadcasting  at  lower cost.  Any
objection to a system of tradeable rights would have to be more subtle.
A conceivable problem with an economic  incentive in this context is
that it may undermine the general purpose of public interest programming
by producing a situation in which that programming  is confined to a small
subset of stations-"cold spots"-in a kind of communications equivalent,
or converse, of the "hot spot" problem in the environmental  area." 83 The
"hot spot" problem arises when trades result in a concentration of pollution
in a single area, with serious  adverse health effects; it is generally agreed
that steps must be taken to ensure that this does not happen."8  In the com-
munications  context, the problem  will arise if all of the widely  viewed
broadcasters  end up selling their obligations  to a single station or set of
stations. This is undesirable if it results in a kind of "ghettoization"  of pub-
lic interest programming  and if it is believed, as seems quite sensible, that
all or most viewers ought to have access to some public interest program-
ming.
A  second problem  is both  conceptual  and  administrative.  When a
trade is made,  what is being traded? Perhaps it seems simplest,  and most
sensible, to trade minutes for minutes. But all broadcast minutes are not the
same. An "internal" trade could be one in which ABC (for example) trades
an hour of prime-time  programming for an hour of 3:00 A.M.  program-
ming; an  external trade  could involve a transfer  of one hour of ABC's
183.  See Pildes & Sunstein, supra  note 175, at 24.
184.  See,  e.g., Stavins, supra  note  177, at 82.
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highly popular evening  hours to (say) FOX's far less popular show in the
same period.  Steps must be taken to ensure that in  any  trade, there is an
equal public interest benefit for public interest loss. Perhaps a test of audi-
ence shares--"viewer-per-viewer"  trades-is the best way to start.
An  approach  of this kind would have the fortunate consequence  of
helping to handle the "cold spot" problem as well. Part of the problem can
be handled by monitoring the sales to make sure that a high-viewer broad-
caster is trading to other high-viewer stations. If the "minute-for-minute"
trades were adjusted to take account of the number of viewers,  a trade to a
low-viewer station would be especially  expensive.  Demographic consid-
erations could play a role  as well. The details are less important than the
suggestion that a creative administrative solution could reduce the relevant
problems, just as these have been handled in the environmental arena.
C.  Economic Incentives and the Constitution
What is the relationship  between economic  incentives and the First
Amendment? A direct tax on undesirable programming, or on the failure to
provide desirable  programming,  would raise  serious  constitutional  ques-
tions. This is because the tax would be a regulation  of speech on the basis
of content. Whether  such  a regulation  would be unconstitutional  should
turn on many of the questions raised in debates  over the legitimacy  of the
"fairness doctrine,"  designed to compel coverage of serious issues and an
opportunity to speak for opposing views. 85 Many people have argued that
with decreasing scarcity, the fairness doctrine is no longer legitimate, if it
ever was.'86 If this objection  is correct, an economic incentive in the form
of a tax would be questionable too.
This point raises the question why, if a tax would be constitutionally
problematic,  a system of "play or pay," which has similar motivations  and
consequences,  would  not be  constitutionally  problematic  as  well. The
intuition might be that a tax is a direct penalty  on a certain programming
content, whereas  "play or pay" simply provides  an alternative  ("pay") to a
legitimate  mandate.  But this seems to be  a form of wordplay.  If a tax  is
questionable, "play or pay" should be questionable as well.
My suggestion here is that there should be no constitutional objection
to the extent that the government is acting, in a viewpoint-neutral  fashion,
to promote  educational  goals  and attention to civic  affairs.  Current  law
gives no clear answer to that question."1  For those  who believe that the
185.  See  Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867  F.2d 654 (D.C.  Cir.  1989),  for an outline of the
issues.
186.  This is the FCC's current position. See id. at 656.
187.  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.  180,  191 (1997)  (upholding  "must carry" rules
as effort  to  promote  widespread dissemination  of information  from a multiplicity  of sources,  but
emphasizing that the rules are content-neutral).  For a general discussion, see  CASS R. SUNSTEIN,  ONE
CASE AT A TIME  172-207 (1999).
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government is prohibited from favoring programming of a particular con-
tent, "play or pay" should be unacceptable.  The problem with this view is
that it seems  to convert  the First Amendment  into a species  of Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics,"' 8  in a way that loosens  the connection  between
the free speech  principle  and underlying  democratic  goals.  If the First
Amendment is associated with democratic self-government and with delib-
erative democracy, "play or pay," of the sort suggested here, would be per-
fectly consistent with the free speech guarantee.  9
D.  Expanding  the Viewscreen: A Glance at the Cathedral
Thus far I have been exploring  economic incentives by contrasting
taxes and tradeable rights with command-and-control regulation. But if we
wanted a more complete picture, we would widen the viewscreen a bit. In a
classic  article,  Guido Calabresi  and A. Douglas Melamed proposed four
"rules" that courts might adopt for nuisance suits."9  Two of the rules come
from a situation in which either the plaintiff or the defendant is given the
relevant entitlement, and it is protected via a "property rule," in which case
the entitlement could be reallocated only through a trade. 191  The other two
rules  come from a situation in which either  is given an  entitlement pro-
tected by a "liability rule,"  in which case the entitlement could be reallo-
cated through a legally forced exchange,  at a price determined through the
legal system (assumed to be the market price)."9  Calabresi and Melamed
also discuss "inalienability rules,"  in which no exchanges  are permitted,
either voluntarily or through the legal system. 193
There is a great deal of room for exploring,  through this lens, the sys-
tem of public interest regulation. If public interest programming is desir-
able, and if certain programming is undesirable, it makes sense to think of
ways of requiring broadcasters  to pay "damages"  or instead requiring  the
taxpaying public to pay for better programming.  Valuation, of course, is a
serious  problem. Suppose that certain programming (educational  or civic,
for example)  is a public good, producing  positive externalities,  and that
certain programming (violent material, for example) is a public bad, pro-
ducing negative  externalities.  How can the government  assign monetary
values to the desirable and undesirable effects? Is it constitutional for the
government to do so? These questions are hard enough in the area of torts;
188.  SPENCER,  supra  note 117.
189.  I  discuss the relationship between  democratic  goals and  regulation of speech in  SUNSTEIN,
supra  note  68, at 17-5 1.
190.  See  Guido  Calabresi  &  A.  Douglas  Melamed,  Property Rules, Liability Rules,  and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,  85 HARv. L. RFv.  1089 (1972).
191.  See id. at 1106.
192.  See id. at 1107.
193.  See id. at 1111-15.
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they are far harder in the context of broadcasting. I restrict myself here to a
comparison of some leading alternatives.
Rule 1.  The government requires all broadcasters  to provide public inter-
est programming;  no bargaining  is allowed.
Comment:  This is the traditional model, with the debate being about
its scope; the number of obligations was sharply reduced in the  1980s,  but
without rethinking the basic model. Under this system, the public's interest
in the relevant programming"9  is protected by an inalienable property rule.
The entitlement is granted to the government, and it is entitled to mandate
broadcaster performance.  Broadcasters  have  a kind  of "split"  property
right; they own the right to broadcast  as they choose (in general), but the
public has  a kind of lien on the property, giving it ownership  rights over
certain areas. Those who like the traditional approach appear to think that
it has  good  social  consequences,  by,  for example,  ensuring  that public
interest programming is not relegated to unpopular times and channels, and
also that it has desirable  "expressive"  effects, by, for example,  affirming
the status of broadcasters as public trustees. As we have seen, it also has
several problems;  its rigidity is likely  to lead  to inefficiency,  and it may
well produce unintended  adverse consequences,  as in the case of the fair-
ness doctrine.
Rule 2a.  The government requires  broadcasters  who do not provide public
interest  programming  to pay a kind of "damage award" to be determined
by the government and then used to fiund public interest  programming  by
others,  such as PBS.
Comment:  Under  this  approach,  the  public  continues  to have  the
relevant entitlement, which is protected  by an unusual liability rule. The
broadcasters'  failure to provide educational programming  for children  or
free air time for candidates would count as a kind of social harm for which
broadcasters  would have to pay. (The same might be said of the provision
of violent  or  sexually  explicit  programming,  though  here  the  First
Amendment  problems  would  be  quite  serious.)  One  problem  with this
approach is the need to calculate the level of the "damage  award."  There
are no clear market measures for this amount, which will therefore have a
level of arbitrariness.
Rule 2b.  The government requires each broadcaster  to provide a certain
level of public interest  programming, but permits broadcasters  to transfer
their obligations (accompanied by  money)  to  others, at a  market-
determined  rate.
194.  I am so describing it for convenience, without making any normative judgment.
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Comment:  This is akin to Rule 2a, in the sense that the public has the
relevant entitlement, which is protected by a kind of liability rule, but here
the market, rather than the legal system, determines the value of not play-
ing the public interest programming.  One station might sell to another its
obligation to provide,  say, one hour of educational programming; the sell-
ing station would pay the market-determined  amount  to ensure that the
buying station will find it worthwhile to take on the new duty. This kind of
market determination could be a substantial  advantage in light of limited
information on the government's part, as the government is in an extremely
poor position to calculate any such "damage award."
As compared with Rule 1, a potential problem with this  approach is
that some people may avoid the stations  that "play"  and may not see the
relevant programming  at all.  On the other hand, the empirical  question
remains whether under Rule 1 most members of the viewing audience will
see and benefit from the mandated programming.
Rule 2c.  The government establishes a minimum total content of public
interest broadcasting  on broadcast  networks each year (for example, 6
hours of  free air time for candidates, 150 hours of educational  program-
ming for children); assigns initial  obligations to each broadcaster;  and
then permits broadcasters  to trade the obligations at market-determined
prices.
Comment:  This is very close to Rule 2b; the only difference is that it
is a precise analogy to certain initiatives  in environmental  law, in which
the government establishes  a maximum level of pollution in the relevant
area, provides pollution permits, and then allows trades among polluters. 15
A disadvantage of this approach,  as compared to Rule 2a, is that it may be
harder to  calculate  the total level  of appropriate  programming  than to
decide on the appropriate tax for those who do not "play."  On the other
hand,  the opposite may be true.'96  An additional  difficulty,  as discussed
above, is that broadcasting  hours are not fungible. An hour of children's
programming is much less valuable  at 3:00 A.M. on Monday than at 9:00
A.M. on Saturday.
Rule 3a.  The government pays broadcasters  (at reasonable  but govern-
ment-determined  rates) to provide  public interest  programming.
Comment:  Under this approach,  the broadcasters  have the relevant
entitlement, which is protected by a liability rule. The broadcaster owns the
entitlement, but the government is permitted to obtain  a forced exchange,
195.  This is the acid deposition program under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.  § 7651 (1994).
196.  These  are brief notes  on a complex  issue. For details  in the environmental  context,  see
Jonathan  Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in the Legal Context
108 YALE L.J. 677,706-35 (1999).
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just as it is in the general law of eminent domain. In fact it is possible to
see some kind of payment as the constitutionally  compelled solution,  at
least if the right to provide  such programming  as broadcasters  choose  is
taken to be, by constitutional  decree,  an entitlement in broadcasters. For
example, the government might be able to compel  coverage  of important
issues,  or attention  to the needs  of children,  or programming  involving
emergencies, but the public has to pay.
Interestingly, the government appears not to have tried this approach,
at least not as a general rule. An advantage of this approach is that it should
not be difficult to calculate the value of the exchange; the market will help
answer that question. This is an important advantage over Rule 2a. On the
other hand, Rule 3a has probably been resisted, as compared with Rules  1,
2a, and 2b, with the thought that because broadcasters  are beneficiaries  of
public largesse, they should not be paid to promote public interest goals.
This  is of course  a distributional concern,  and the underlying judgment-
that  "broadcasters,"  rather  than  "taxpayers,"  should pay-is not clearly
correct in light of the complexity of the incidence of the burden imposed
under Rules  1, 2a, or 2b. The burden under the latter rules does not simply
fall  on "broadcasters,"  but more likely  on  advertisers  and ultimately on
consumers-perhaps  to the benefit of those who advertise in newspapers
and on cable. Rule 3a might be preferable if it is amended as suggested in
Rule 5a, which would require broadcasters  to buy spectrum rights.
An important difference between Rule 3a and Rules 2a, 2b, and 2c is
that the latter rules give the entitlement to the public, in a way that may
have important psychological  effects on any trades. The initial allocation
of the entitlement creates  an endowment effect  and tends  to "stick,"'"  in
part because of its legitimating function.  Those who favor public interest
obligations might be skeptical of Rule 3a for this reason alone.
An additional problem with this kind of system is that it may provide
broadcasters  with an incentive to produce less public interest broadcasting
on  their  own  than  they  otherwise  would,  or at  least  to understate  the
amount that  they  would voluntarily  provide.  In  an  unrestricted  market,
political and shareholder pressures, conscience,  and advertiser and viewer
demand  will  result in  a  nontrivial  amount  of public interest  program-
ming.9'  But if the government proposes to pay broadcasters  for whatever
public interest programming they provide,  voluntary service may be sub-
stantially reduced. This is a pervasive problem with paying  people to  do
good or not to do bad; the payment may induce less of the good or more of
197.  See  RICHARD  H.  THALER,  THE  WINNER'S  CURSE:  PARADOXES  AND  ANOMALIES  OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 63-66 (1992).
198.  See  NATIONAL  ASSOCIATION  OF  BROADCASTERS,  BROADCASTERS:  BRINGING  COMMUNITY
SERVICE HOME  2-4 (1998).
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the bad. The  question for Rule  3 is whether it is possible  to generate a
"baseline production level" from which any subsidy could be calculated.
Rule 3b.  The government must-and does-buy the right  to ensure public
interest  programming,  at market-determined  rates.
Comment:  This is a variation on 3a in the sense that it transforms the
broadcasters'  entitlement into one protected by a property rule. It is akin to
a  system  of  free  markets  in  broadcasting,  but  with  two  qualifica-
tions:  Broadcasters are not required to pay for their entitlement in the first
instance, and government stands ready to compete with others who seek to
obtain access to viewers.  One advantage of Rule 3b over 3a is that it oper-
ates  entirely on the basis of market-determined  prices;  no one has to cal-
culate a special  government rate. But if one believes that existing fare is
not problematic, the government's purchases  will be wasteful.  And those
committed to public interest programming  may object that the government
will not purchase enough (unless this is specified in some way in advance);
they may also object that so long as licenses  are being given away free,
other rules, not giving a "windfall" to broadcasters, are better.
Rule 4.  Broadcasters  provide such public interest broadcasting  as they
choose, including none at all.
Comment:  Under this approach, the broadcasters'  interest is protected
by a property  rule.  Broadcasters  own  the  relevant  entitlement.  Just  as
occurs in an ordinary market, people  can pay broadcasters  to provide pub-
lic interest programming,  at market-determined  prices. The problem with
this approach  is that the market price might be too high, for all of the rea-
sons discussed in Part I.B of this Article. This approach is similar to Rule
3b, except that the government does  not stand ready to ensure  a certain
level of public interest programming.
Rule 5a. Broadcasters  must buy, via auction, the right to broadcast,  and
once they do that, they can provide such public interest broadcasting  as
they choose, including  none at all.
Comment:  This  is  a  genuine  market solution.  It does  not involve
a governmental  "giveaway"  of a  scarce resource,  and after the valuable
commodity has been purchased,  free trades are allowed. It seems to have
all the advantages of Rule 4, with the further  advantage that the valuable
property right is purchased  rather than  simply  conferred.  The problems
with this approach should be easy to identify from Part I.B of this Article.
In short, the result may be insufficient public interest programming, partly
because  of the  endowment  effect,  partly because  of collective  action
problems,  partly  because  of the  limitations  of the market model  in the
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communications industry, and partly because of public aspirations diverg-
ing from private consumption choices.
Rule 5b.  Broadcasters  must buy, via auction, the right to broadcast,  but
once they do that, they may be asked or (if for some reason necessary)
compelled to provide public interest broadcasting  at market-determined
prices.
Comment:  This is quite similar to Rule 5a. The difference is that the
government stands ready to pay for public interest programming on broad-
cast stations, at market prices; and if broadcasters  for some reason refuse,
the government can force an exchange. Under Rule 5b, part of the entitle-
ment is owned, but protected only by a liability rule. This approach  is in
one sense a cousin of Rule 2b. The major difference  is that here the tax-
payers are paying for public interest programming (at the same time that
they  receive  money  from  the  sale  of  the  spectrum),  rather  than
"broadcasters."  The  most important difference is therefore  distributional.
As noted above, that difference  is more complex than it seems in light of
the fact that when a burden is imposed on "broadcasters,"  their advertisers
are  likely to be paying much of the bill, and the result will be  complex
effects on consumers, on other communications outlets,  and on advertising
choices. There is no simple redistribution, in Rule 2b, from "broadcasters"
to the "public."
Rule 5c.  Broadcasters  must buy, via auction, the right to broadcast;  once
they do so, they may be subject to public interest obligations,  but they can
pay a "damage award," to be used by some other station to support  public
interest  programming,  if they fail  to fulfill their obligations  themselves.
Comment:  This should also decrease the amount paid for the entitle-
ment, as compared with Rule 5a. This is a "play or pay"  version of Rules
5a and  5b. The  problem  here lies in  determining  the level  of any  such
"damage  award."  This approach is in one sense  a cousin of Rule 2a, as a
"play or pay" system.
A full  understanding  of these  possibilities  would greatly  facilitate
both conceptual and empirical inquiry. Undoubtedly  a choice  among the
various  options  should  depend  partly  on  the  particular public  interest
obligation  involved; for example,  a requirement  of emergency  warnings
might take the form of Rule  1, whereas  a requirement of free air time for
candidates might be some combination of Rules 1, 2b, and 5b. The analysis
thus  far suggests that Rules 2b and 5b have special  advantages  over the
alternatives.  Rule 2b, the basic "play or pay" system, seems well-suited to
the current period, as  a kind of interim improvement over the regulatory
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status quo. In some areas, Rule 5b may well be better in the longer term, as
broadcasters come to resemble  general-interest magazines.  Movement in
the direction of selling the spectrum, rather than giving it away to prese-
lected owners, would also be highly desirable.
E.  A Brief  Note on Cultural  Policies  and Cultural  Subsidies
The immediately preceding discussion raises obvious questions about
when and whether it is appropriate for the government to devote collective
resources to the promotion of a better cult-are,  and in particular, to promo-
tion of a better democratic  order. A "cultural policy"  might, for example,
involve the use of taxpayer funds to promote opera or high art, perhaps by
subsidizing musicians  and artists,  perhaps  by making it easier for poor
people and  children  to afford  to go,  perhaps by  creating  a situation  in
which  people  can  attend  at  vastly  reduced  rates  or  even for  free.  In
Washington,  D.C.,  for  example,  people  can  attend  public  museums,
including  those devoted  to  historical  and democratic  issues, for free,  a
practice  that  creates  a distinctive  atmosphere  for people  who  visit the
nation's capitol. Such visits would have a different tone if, for example, it
were necessary to pay three dollars to attend the National Archives, which
house the original  Declaration of Independence,  Constitution, and Bill of
Rights.
The general topic of public funding of cultural  endeavors is highly
controversial  and has received  considerable  attention.1"  The discussion
thus far suggests, at a minimum, that such policies should be less contro-
versial  when individual consumption  choices  involve a collective  action
problem, or when in their capacity as citizens, most people urge their gov-
ernment to promote  some  activity in order to promote  genuinely  public
aspirations.  The argument is most secure when those aspirations involve
democracy  itself. There is reason for the government to support program-
ming that promotes public education about civic affairs, whether or not that
programming  is provided by markets themselves;  and at a minimum, gov-
ernment  subsidies  of this  kind  are  firmly  supported  on  theoretical
grounds.2®
VI
VOLUNTARY  SELF-REGULATION:  ASPIRATIONS,  TRUSTEES,  AND
'WINNER-TAKE-LEss"  CODES
In this Part, I discuss the possibility of promoting public interest goals
through voluntary self-regulation,  as through a "code"  of conduct to be
issued and enforced by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), or
199.  See, e.g.,  Ronald Dworkin,  Can A Liberal State Support Art?, in A MATTER  OF PRINCIPLE
221,221-35 (1985).
200.  See Baker, supra  note 60, at 383-408.
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perhaps by a wider range of those who produce television for the American
public. The idea of voluntary self-regulation--of television and content on
the Internet-has received growing attention in many nations." 0' For many
decades, in fact, the NAB did indeed impose a code, partly to promote its
economic interest  (by raising the price of advertising), partly to fend off
regulation  (by showing that the industry was engaged  in self-regulation),
and  partly to  carry  out the  moral  commitments  of broadcasters  them-
selves.'  And voluntary self-regulation has played a role in numerous areas
of media policy, including, for example,  cigarette advertising,  children's
advertising, family  viewing,  advertising  of hard liquor,  and fairness  in
news reporting.0'  A code has a great deal of potential.  Above all,  it could
address a far greater number of problems than could an economic incentive
(for First Amendment reasons),  and it appears  to have far more potential
for producing good, and reducing bad, than a disclosure requirement.
For  example,  a  code  could  address  all public  interest  obligations
mentioned  thus far, but also  attempt to protect against sexually  violent
material,  against subliminal advertising, against sensationalistic  treatment
of politics, and against a wide range of other problems with television. The
question is whether it is possible, in the current  era, for broadcasters  to
overcome some of the unfortunate effects  of the marketplace  with volun-
tary measures. An underlying question, likely to be faced in many areas of
regulatory policy both domestically and internationally,  is whether a code
would work as a kind of unfortunate cartelization or instead as protection
against an undesirable "race to the bottom."
A  code might  do a great  deal of good, partly because  of the likely
existence of external monitors,  partly because of a code's  capacity to help
develop a kind of internal morality likely to affect many of its signatories.
A general lesson is that the antitrust laws ought not to be invoked too read-
ily  to prevent producers  from undertaking cooperative  action in circum-
stances in which competition  is producing palpable  social harms. In  such
contexts, a code can provide some of the advantages  of government regu-
lation, but  do  so in  a more  flexible  and  better-informed  fashion.  It  is
hazardous  to invoke the antitrust laws to prevent an industry from provid-
ing the kinds of benefits that might be provided, more crudely  and expen-
sively, by direct regulation.20
201.  See Goldberg et al., supra note 5, at 312. For a general discussion, see  IAN AYRES  & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE,  RESPONSIVE  REGULATION:  TRANSCENDING  THE  DEREGULATION  DEBATE  103-16
(1992).
202.  See infra  Part VI.B.3.
203.  See Campbell, supra  note 21, at 715-37,
204.  See FRANK  & COOK, supra  note 23, at 225-27.
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A.  The Problem and a Recently Emerging Strategy
Notwithstanding the qualifications described above, competitive pres-
sures often can and do provide programming that people would like to see.
In an era of cable and satellite television, and an increasingly large range of
options, competitive  pressures will be especially  important in producing
"niche" programming for people who have a particular interest in serious
programming.  The communications  market increasingly  resembles  the
market for magazines;  recall the possibility, in a digital market, of over one
thousand stations.  But competitive pressures  have a downside. They can
lead to sensationalistic, prurient, or violent programming,  and to a failure
to provide sufficient attention to educational values, or to the kind of pro-
gramming that is indispensable to a well-functioning  democracy. ° s This is
so especially in light of the fact that a small relative advantage can lead to
huge increases  in viewers,  a fact  that presses television  in  tabloid-like
directions. As Robert Frank and Philip Cook have suggested,
[i]ncreasingly  impoverished political  debate is yet another cost of
our current cultural trajectory.  Complex modem societies generate
complex economic and social problems, and the task of choosing
the best course is difficult under the best of circumstances.  And yet,
as in-depth  analysis and commentary  give way  to sound bites  in
which  rival journalists  and  politicians  mercilessly  ravage  one
another, we become  an increasingly  ill-informed and ill-tempered
electorate.2"
It would be possible to respond to the harmful effects of competitive
pressures in various ways. Probably the simplest response would take the
form of voluntary  self-regulation,  through some kind of "code"  of good
programming;  this  approach  is  specifically  designed  to respond  to the
problems that can be introduced by market pressures. In various  nations,
including the United States, cooperative  action has played a constructive
role in situations of this kind.2"  Though it has yet to receive much aca-
demic commentary, 2 s voluntary self-regulation  via industry agreements  is
emerging  as a regulatory  strategy of choice,  especially  in the environ-
mental  arena?°  The  EPA, for example,  has encouraged  companies  that
produce  pesticides  to  agree  on  pesticide  reduction  strategies,  and  here
205.  See HAMILTON, supra  note 45, at 129-284 (discussing television violence).
206.  FRANK & CooK, supra  note 23, at 203.
207.  See the discussion of ethical codes in Israel in MOSHE NEGBI,THE ENEMY WITHIN  14 (1998)
(discussion paper published by the Joan Shorenstein  Center at Harvard University's  John F.  Kennedy
School of Government).  Note also that many international bodies attempt to certify quality in a kind of
cooperative action designed to reduce adverse effects of market pressures.  See infra note 218.
208.  An exception  is Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Seyf-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 LAw  & POL'Y 363  (1997).  See also AYRES  & BRAITHWATE, supra note 201,  at 101-
32; Campbell, supra  note 21, at 715-45.
209.  See GUNNINGHAM  ET AL.,  supra  note 20, at 5O-56,300-10.
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the fact of broad agreement is crucial."'  California has attempted  to deal
with the problem of workplace  accidents via a "cooperative  compliance
program"  involving self-enforced  safety plans on large construction proj-
ects.  The  result has  been  a significant  drop  in  accident rates.2"'  Self-
regulating  agreements are now in place in Canada's system for forest man-
agement; in the Responsible Care program of the chemical industry, now
operating  in  more  than  forty  countries;  and  in  national regulation  of
nuclear power plants
12
What  accounts  for  the  increasing  popularity  of  industry  self-
regulation, as part of the general project of "reinventing government"?1 3
From the industry's  standpoint, self-regulation  allows far more flexibility
than government mandates. From the standpoint of government, a special
advantage of codes is that they avoid the kind of informational  overload
that comes from government prescriptions.214 It is partly for this reason that
voluntary agreements  among companies have had good effects in the area
of occupational safety and health?15 In a point of special relevance to tele-
vision, codes  also have been found to have the power to influence commu-
nity attitudes  in a way that  tends to  contribute to the development  of a
custodial  ethic.2 16  Thus,  codes  have  helped  to  develop  an institutional
morality that brings  the behavior of industry members within a normative
framework.
2 1 7
Such cooperative  action raises concerns  about antitrust violations and
self-interested  profit-seeking  under  a public-spirited  guise.  This  is  of
course a risk, but the antitrust law can go wrong when it prevents coopera-
tive action that overcomes  palpably  adverse effects  of market pressures.
Indeed, the International Standards Organization is designed specifically to
ensure  a form  of cooperation  to  overcome  those adverse  effects;28  the
question is whether that experience has communications analogues.
210.  See id.  at 300.
211.  See Gunningham & Rees, supra  note 208, at 369.
212.  See GUNNINGHAM  ET AL., supra  note 20, at 51.
213.  See Special Issue on Self-Regulation, supra note 22.
214.  See AYes & BRArrnwArr,  supra  note 201, at 110-12.
215.  See JOHN MENDENHALL,  REGULATING  OCCUPATIONAL  SAFETY  AND  HEALTH 41-48  (1989);
JOSEPH V. REES,  REFORMING  THE  WORKPLACE:  A  STUDY  OF  SELF-REGULATION  IN  OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY 80-82 (1988).
216.  See GUNNINGRAM  ET AL., supra  note 20, at 162.
217.  See Gunniagham & Rees, supra note 208, at 371-72.
218.  See,  for example,  Michael Prest, Profit Bows to Ethics, INDEPENDENT  (London),  Oct. 26,
1997, at 3, stating that:
Some of the world's biggest companies are putting their weight behind a new, verifiable code
of conduct intended to answer mounting  consumer criticism of the exploitative conditions
under which the goods they  sell are produced in poor countries....  The code, called SA8000
(Social Accountability  8000),  is  the brainchild  of the Council on Economic Priorities,  an
American public interest group, which tries to improve corporate responsibility.  It has been
drawn up by companies,  non-governmental  organisations, trade unions, and other interested
groups,  and is  due to start operating next year. The code covers the basic issues of child
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My emphasis here is on allowing programmers  and journalists to do
what, in an important  sense, they would actually prefer to do. It is worth
underlining this point. Many journalists in the world of broadcasting would
very much like to do better;219 competitive pressures are the problem, not
the solution, and a voluntary code could help them and the public as well.
B.  A Code: Sample Provisions
The question is whether it might be possible to adopt a new code for
broadcasting,  specifically  designed for the new communications  market.
There have been many precursors for voluntary self-regulation via codes."
A new code might update the old NAB code,  and help overcome  current
problems,  without  having  the  degree  of  tepidness  of  the  existing
"standards."  A code might even promote some of the goals associated with
deliberative democracy.
What provisions might a new code include? The appropriate level of
specificity  is  an important  concern;  especially  clear  provisions  ("three
hours  of educational  programming  per week")  risk excessive  rigidity,
whereas  vague  provisions  ("reasonable  efforts  to  provide  educational
programming  for children")  risk meaninglessness.  Discussions  of code-
making in general have stressed the need for "the public announcement  of
the principles  and practices  that  the  industry  presumptively  accepts  as
a  guide to  appropriate  conduct  and  also  as  a basis  for evaluating  and
criticizing performance."'  This point argues in favor of a degree of speci-
ficity.
Consider the following possible  code provisions,  simply  for the
sake of illustration:
1.  Each  broadcaster shall provide three hours  of free  air time for
candidates during the two-month period preceding the election.
In return for free  air time, candidates  shall discuss  substantive
labour,  forced  labour,  health  and  safety, trade  union rights,  discrimination,  discipline,
working hours, and pay.... As the name SA8000 suggests, it is the first to be modelled on
existing  and widely  accepted  commercial  standards  such as  IS09000,  drawn  up  by  the
International  Standards  Organisation  in Geneva,  which  is  used  to determine  whether
companies  have the management  systems  to meet required  product quality. But the  real
strength of the new  approach is commercial  sanctions. A company  which  adopts  the code
also agrees to be independently inspected to see whether it is abiding by the conditions laid
down. It will be able to attract customers and gain a competitive advantage by advertising the
fact that its factories and suppliers meet the standard.
219.  See ScsmcHmTE,  supra  note 50, at 455-58.
220.  See FINAL REPoRT, supra  note 19, at 114-16.
221.  Gunningham & Rees, supra  note 208, at 383.
222.  These provisions are adapted but substantially revised from the more detailed code suggested
by the Advisory  Committee's  FINAL REPORT,  supra note  19. I believe that the provisions  described
there are too vague  and tepid to be useful (I can attest that this  was a quid pro quo for Committee
agreement);  for reasons discussed in the text, vague and tepid provisions create a high probability  of
futility and ineffectiveness.
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issues in a  substantive way  and must provide  something  other
than short "sound bites."
2.  Each  broadcaster  shall  provide  one  hour  of educational  pro-
gramming  for children each  day. Broadcasters  shall attempt  to
ensure that children are not exposed to excessively  violent pro-
gramming or programming that is otherwise harmful to, or inap-
propriate for, children.  Broadcasters  shall avoid  programming
that  encourages  criminal  or  self-destructive  behavior;  they
should also be  sensitive in presenting  sexual material  that chil-
dren might encounter.
3.  News coverage shall be substantive and issue-oriented. It should
not emphasize the sensational  and the prurient. It should concern
itself with claims  and  disagreements  on matters  of substance.
Consistent with the exercise of legitimate station discretion, sta-
tions should not give excessive or undue attention to sensational
accusations,  or to reports of "who  is  ahead in the polls," at the
expense of other issues.
4.  Morbid,  sensationalistic,  or alarming  details  not essential  to a
factual  report, especially  in connection  with stories  of crime or
sex,  should be  avoided.  News  should  be broadcast  in  such  a
manner  as  to  avoid panic  and  unnecessary  alarm.  News  pro-
gramming should attempt to avoid prurience, sensationalism, and
gossip. Stations  should make an effort to devote enough time to
public issues to permit genuine  understanding  of problems and
disagreements.
5.  Violence should be portrayed responsibly and not exploitatively.
Presentation  of violence should avoid the excessive,  the gratui-
tous, the humiliating, and the instructional. The use of violence
for  its  own  sake  and  the  detailed  dwelling  upon brutality  or
physical agony, by sight or sound, should be avoided. Programs
involving violence should venture to present the consequences to
its victims  and perpetrators.  Particular care should be exercised
where children may see, or are involved in, the depiction of vio-
lent behavior. Programs should not present rape, sexual assault,
or sexual violence in an attractive or exploitative light.
6.  Broadcasters  shall ensure that their programming is responsive to
the needs of citizens with  disabilities.  To this end,  broadcasters
shall ensure that programming  is accessible,  through the provi-
sion of closed  captioning  and other  means,  to  the extent  that
doing so does not impose  an undue burden on the broadcaster.
Particular efforts should be made to provide  full access  to news
and public affairs  programming.  Hearing impaired citizens  are
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sometimes  at risk  of a  form  of  disenfranchisement,  or  even
physical danger, because steps are not taken to ensure that televi-
sion broadcasting  is available to them. Stations  should take spe-
cial  steps  to  ensure  that  information  about  disasters  and
emergencies  is  fully  accessible  to  those  who  are  hearing
impaired, ideally in "real time."
7.  Broadcasters  shall cover  international  as well as domestic ques-
tions and give appropriate coverage to important events in other
nations. They should recognize that purely national questions are
often hard to evaluate  without an understanding  of the practices
of others,  and also  that many questions, including those of war
and  peace,  cannot  be  well-understood  without  the  kind  of
background that comes from suitable attention  to developments
and events abroad.
C.  A Code: Problems and Prospects
Such a code would of course raise many  questions.  The first would
involve the problem of enforcement.  Without an enforcement  mechanism,
a code might have  no effect  at all, indeed  it might be a form  of public
deception.'  The enforcement  question  is  a central  part  of the  general
inquiry into the preconditions for effective self-regulation. 4
There  are several obvious possibilities. The simplest would be for the
NAB  to undertake  enforcement  on its own, just as  it did under the old
code. It might, for example, give a seal of approval to those who are shown
to comply with its provisions  and deny a  seal of approval  to those who
have been shown not to have complied. The NAB might also give special
public recognition to those stations that have compiled an excellent public
service  record in the past year.  Such recognition  might be awarded  for,
among other things, meeting the needs of children in a sustained and crea-
tive way; offering substantive and extended coverage  of elections, includ-
ing  interviews,  free  air  time,  and  debates;  offering  substantive  and
extended coverage of public issues; and providing opportunities for discus-
sion  of problems  facing  the  local  community.  At  the  time  of license
renewal,  a  notation  might  be  given  to  the  FCC  that  there  has  been
compliance or continuing or egregious noncompliance with the code. If the
NAB is unwilling to enforce a code of this kind,225 perhaps a private group
223.  See John Braithwaite,  Responsive Business Regulatory Institutions, in BUSINESS,  ETHICS,
AND  LAW  91  (C. Cody  & C. Sampford  eds.,  1993)  (discussing need for enforcement mechanisms);
Campbell, supra note 21,  at 756-69 (offering a skeptical view of the likelihood of success from any
code).  For  a helpful overview  of the preconditions  for  success,  see Douglas  C. Michael,  Federal
Agency Use ofAudited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADanN. L. REv. 171  (1995).
224.  See generally  GUNNIGHAM  ET AL., supra note 20, at 155-72; Michael, supra note 223.
225.  In the summer of 1998 and January  1999, the NAB  decided not to oppose the idea of a code
publicly and officially, but did suggest "serious concern"  about any government effort to interfere with
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could take the initiative, both promulgating the code and publicizing it, and
in that (modest) sense sanctioning violations. 6 A special problem here is
that in  light of increasing  competition  from nonbroadcast  programming
sources, a code would not be in the economic interest of broadcasters even
if generally  adopted,  and  this  is  an  unpromising  fact  for  a  code's
effectiveness? 7 Perhaps supplemental  enforcement will come from rivals
of those who defect from the agreement  and violate the code; this is a rea-
sonable prediction  in theory,  and  something  similar  has  been found  in
analogous areas."
Any  enforcement  by the NAB  or even  a private  monitoring  group
would be most likely to succeed if accompanied  by external pressures  of
one sort or another. As in the case of disclosure requirements,  the most
promising possibilities include public interest groups able to mobilize rele-
vant  social norms and to focus media attention  on derelict actors. 229 Per-
haps  such activity would be accompanied  by market pressures  of various
sorts, as consumer action has had significant effects on code enforcement
in related areas 3 0 A degree of FCC interest in the existence of code viola-
tions would also help.
These points raise a related question:  the appropriate  scope  of any
such code. Undoubtedly such a code was less painful and easier to operate
when three broadcasters  exhausted the universe of television. Broadcasters
now  find  themselves  in  competition  with  many  other  entertainment
sources,  including cable  and the Internet. In these circumstances,  broad-
casters  are not  likely  to  constrain  themselves  if their  competitors  are
not similarly  constrained;  the competition  for an  audience  for news  is
much affected by the existence of "tabloid television,"  and a rule limited
to broadcasters  would raise an obvious question  about fairness. A broad-
caster who ties himself to the mast may find himself with a significantly
reduced audience.  This point suggests  that in the development of a code,
broadcasters  should  perhaps  be joined  by  the National  Association  of
Cable Television.
By itself, however, a code limited to broadcasters  should do consider-
able good, even if some broadcasters  are reluctant to subscribe to it. When
the market reaches the stage in which broadcasters  are merely some of a
editorial freedom. See Paige Albiniak, Preparing  for Battle,  BROADCASTING  & CABLE,  July 6,  1998, at
22; Fox Still Undecided on Leaving  NAB,  Expresses Concerns,  CoMM. DAiLY, Jan.  14,  1999, at 6.
226.  This approach would have special advantages in light of the fact that some stations are  not
members of the NAB. For NAB stations that must compete  with nonmember stations, a code creates  an
obvious competitive risk, and there  is a continuing question whether it is possible to design strategies,
public or private, to combat this risk.
227.  See GUNNINGHAM  ET AL., supra  note 20, at 53-54  (emphasizing relation between  economic
self-interest and self-regulation).  -
228.  See Gunningham & Rees, supra  note 208, at 403 (finding enforcement from competitors).
229.  See id. at 390-92.
230.  See id. at 391 (discussing hostile consumer action).
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large number of providers,  with no distinctive status, it might make sense
to think of a more general  code (with suitable adjustments for particular
kinds of programmers).3 1 It is worth underlining  the point that, as in the
context of disclosure, the likelihood of success will increase with the exis-
tence  of third-party  monitors,  both public  and  private,  and  also with  a
threat of more intrusive action should it prove necessary.3 2
D.  Notes on the First  Amendment and Antitrust  Law
A code for television broadcasters  might be thought to raise issues
of both  constitutional  and  antitrust law.  The  constitutional  issues  are
relatively  straightforward;  the antitrust issues are  a bit more complex.  I
offer a brief discussion here.
There  is essentially  no risk that a  code of the sort  suggested here
would create serious First Amendment problems. By itself, a code is a pri-
vate set of guidelines,  and private guidelines by themselves raise no First
Amendment issue- 3 If a private group decides to impose restrictions  on
the  speech  of its members,  and  government  is  not involved, the  First
Amendment is irrelevant.'  Of course things would be different if govern-
ment mandated any such code.
Nor would provisions like those described above be likely to violate
the antitrust laws. The Department of Justice  has so concluded,  as have
district courts in two important cases in which the private antitrust actions
at issue involved parts of previous  codes.  The district court in American
Brands, Inc. v. National  Ass'n of Broadcasters5  examined  a claim that
code  standards  forbidding  cigarette  advertising  violated  antitrust  laws.
That  court refused  to  issue  an  injunction  against  such  standards.  In
American Federation  of Television and Radio Artists v. National  Ass 'n of
Broadcasters,6 the district court upheld code standards regarding  adver-
tising aimed at children. The courts in both of these cases found the code
standards reasonable  and in the public interest. As I have noted, the most
231.  For example, it is hardly clear that a station devoted to children should be required to provide
free air time for political candidates.
232.  See GuNNiNOHAm  ET AL., supra  note 20, at 55-56.
233.  See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.  v. United  States Olympic Comm.,  483 U.S.  522
(1987)  (holding that the Constitution is not applicable to Olympic Committee);  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S.  830 (1982)  (holding that the Constitution is inapplicable  to private actors);  Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S.  149 (1978) (noting that a private contract raises no First Amendment issue). If a code
is  a product of government  threat, and is  effectively required by government,  the First Amendment
comes  into play. There can be no question that  a governmentally  mandated code, not voluntary but
taking the form outlined here, would raise legitimate constitutional problems. This does not necessarily
mean that the First Amendment would be violated, but it does mean that the code would have to be
tested  for compliance  with First Amendment principles,  including  constitutional  limits  on content
regulation.
234.  See cases discussed supra  note 233.
235.  308 F. Supp. 1166 (D.D.C.  1969).
236.  407 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y.  1976).
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recent code's disintegration came at the hand of a 1979 antitrust action, in
which the Department of Justice alleged that certain Code provisions vio-
lated the Sherman Act. But the Justice Department's complaint was quite
narrow, and the court's decision 7  would not invalidate a code of the sort
suggested  here."  The  television market's  unique  characteristics  would
allow a code of the sort porposed here to survive a "rule of reason" inquiry,
which requires balancing of the relevant factors. It would be most reason-
able  to hold that any restrictions  contained  in the code  would promote
competition  as well as various public interests  goals, such as education  of
children, access for the handicapped, and other civic functions.239
E.  Less Puzzling Puzzles
We are now in a position to disentangle the two puzzles discussed in
Part I.B  above. Why were  broadcasters  pleased  that the proposed NAB
code would violate antitrust laws? Why did they prefer rigid government
mandates to a flexible,  "play or pay" approach? The broadcasters  on the
Committee favored  a  code  partly because  they  thought  it  a good  idea
in principle  and  partly  because  they  had  little  to lose  from  it. Though
generally "winners,"  they were selected for the Committee because of their
commitment, through both words and deeds,  to moderating  some  of the
adverse effects of competition. They  were vulnerable  to "winner-take-all"
effects  insofar  as  they  were  reluctant  to engage  in certain  competitive
practices. In this way, a code might even help them. But the NAB  would
not like a meaningful  code at all. The broadcasting  industry  as a whole
would be hurt by  such a code,  especially because cable  television would
not be bound by it. Why should broadcasters,  in an intensely  competitive
market, give a significant edge to cable? Especially if the result would be
that cable could take a lot more, of the viewing audience than it now does?
It is not surprising if broadcasters  who  supply  a large  degree of public
interest programming believe that they would be net winners with a code-
and if the broadcasting industry as a whole believes  that it would be a net
loser. Such an industry, cautious about invoking its own economic interest
alone, is all too likely to invoke the antitrust laws (or the First Amendment)
for purely strategic and self-interested reasons.
This point also helps explain the Committee broadcasters'  skepticism
about "play or pay" alternatives. A set of rigid public interest requirements
does not hurt them and may even help them, insofar as it places their com-
petitors under legal duties  that they  would  themselves  meet voluntarily
(because of their aspirations or because of the particular demands of their
audience and their advertisers). A system of "play or pay" would mean that
237.  See United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (1982).
238.  See  FINAL  REPORT, supra note 19.
239.  See id. at 120-21.
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these broadcasters  would be undercut  by competitors  who, unwilling to
play, would pay-and  capture  a  large  audience  share,  in  a version  of
"winner-take-most."  But this is not a convincing objection to a system of
"play  or pay." It is true that some of those who "play"  will be at a com-
petitive  disadvantage  with respect to some of those who "pay"  others to
play instead. But by itself this competitive  disadvantage is not worthy  of
concern,  any more than  we  should be concerned  when,  in the environ-
mental context,  some of those who reduce pollution  are at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to those who, instead of reducing pollution, pay
a substantial fee to third parties who have reduced pollution. The question
is what approach yields the best outcome for the public. If there is too little
public interest broadcasting,  or too much pollution, the solution is not the
simple  command  to "play,"  or to "reduce,"  but to increase  the price for
failing to play or for failing to reduce.2
The best defense of a code of the sort I have discussed is that it would
produce  "winner-take-less"  outcomes,  in  a  way  that  would  provide
significant benefits  for the public by diminishing  some of the  adverse
effects  of market competition  and by strengthening broadcaster  norms in
favor of obligations to children  and to democratic values. And if this is so,
it provides  a general  lesson  about how  voluntary  private  action  might
sometimes handle problems usually dealt with by direct regulation-and a
lesson  about the reflexive  use of the antitrust laws  to prevent producer
cooperation. A key question is whether mechanisms  might be created to
ensure compliance with any such code.
VII
A SUMMARY
This discussion has ranged over a number of regulatory tools,  and it
may be helpful,  by way of summary,  to discuss them all  briefly and  at
once. We have seen that both disclosure and codes have the advantage of
ensuring a minimal government  role, in a way that reduces  constitutional
concerns  and also allows  a high degree of flexibility. The danger is that
these remedies will have little effect; here the key question is whether there
are good external monitors,  able to impose reputational or other costs on
those who do poorly. We have also seen that "taxes"  on programming  that
does not serve  public interest  goals,  and subsidies  to programming  that
does serve such goals, can have similar effects. A principal problem with
subsidies is that they create an incentive not to provide such programming
voluntarily. The following table charts the basic territory:
240.  With the qualification that this could involve hot spots and cold spots, discussed supra at Part
V.B.
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Some of these tools could serve as complements rather than as alter-
natives.  Disclosure  makes  sense with or without  additional  strategies.  It
should be the least controversial  item on the list; the only real question is
what else should accompany it. Disclosure is likely to work especially well
in tandem with voluntary self-regulation,  indeed  the two tools are natural
allies. By contrast, mandates  and economic  incentives are  genuine com-
petitors,  and in the current context, economic  incentives generally  seem
best, with mandates operating as a "backstop," probably to be eliminated in
the long term. 24
As  I have emphasized,  these recommendations  are  designed for the
current stage of telecommunications  technology;  they  are  also  likely  to
make  sense for the near term. For the next decade,  the key  question  is
whether initiatives  designed for broadcasters  should be  applied  to cable
programmers  as well (especially disclosure and  compliance  with a code).
In the very long term, when broadcasters occupy no special role, it may be
best to impose  disclosure  requirements  on general-interest  stations,  and
also to subsidize high-quality programming  of various sorts. A reasonable
conclusion would be that in the long-term, public  interest programming
will be best promoted via subsidies, not through regulation of any kind. In
such  an era, much will  have been  gained  and much will  also have been
lost, with the fragmentation  of the television market, with less in the way
of common experiences,  and, possibly, with less frequent exposure to seri-
ous coverage of serious  issues0 2 It is too soon to know whether the very
long term will come in the next decade or long thereafter. 243
One final note:  The discussion here has been focused on law, not on
norms or culture;  but the argument for a certain conception  of the social
role of television bears at least as much on norms and culture as on law. It
is possible  to  think that  before long, it will not make  sense  to  impose
regulatory requirements  on CBS,  NBC, ABC,  and Fox, any  more than it
makes sense to impose regulatory requirements  on Newsweek,  Time,  The
New  York Times, USA  Today, National  Review,  or The New Republic. I
have argued against this conclusion, but it must be taken seriously. Even if
it is  accepted,  it is crucial  to say that those  who provide television,  like
those who produce newspapers  and magazines, have a distinctive cultural
responsibility,  associated  with  the promotion  of a  democratic  culture.
Many people not subject to regulation  take  this responsibility  seriously;
many do not. If law diminishes  as a constraining  force, it is all the more
important to speak on behalf of the basic norms-protection  of children,
241.  For an  overlapping discussion, emphasizing the value of "industry  mixes" in the context  of
environmental law, see  GUNNINGHAM  ET AL., supra note 20, at 422-48.
242.  See LEssIG,  supra note 66, at 185-86.
243.  See OWEN,  supra note 3,  at 311-26  (predicting that convergence will take a long time, with
the suggestion that the Internet may never become an important means of delivering television).
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groups, including  the hearing impaired-that have undergirded  regulatory
law in the past. If it flourishes, a "trustee culture"  can do much of the work
of the law.
CONCLUSION
Much of the discussion here has involved appropriate regulatory tools.
For the most part, the policy instruments of choice should not involve rigid
dictates or commands, which are expensive and potentially counterproduc-
tive, and in any  case ill-suited to an era of rapidly changing technology. I
have suggested a strong preference for the less intrusive options of disclo-
sure,  economic incentives,  and voluntary  self-regulation.  Disclosure has
been a surprisingly  successful, low-cost strategy in other areas  of regula-
tory law. If certain broadcasting  is  seen  as  a public good,  analogous to
clean air, economic incentives may be able to accomplish a good deal,  and
to  do  so  at relatively  low cost.  Because  competitive  pressures  are fre-
quently the engine behind poor broadcaster performance,  voluntary  self-
regulation may turn out to be a desirable kind of "cartel,"  helping to coun-
teract short-term interests. Through this route it may be possible to develop
an intermediate system of controls, responding to the market and nonmar-
ket failures of current markets, but without introducing the rigidity and in-
efficiencies  of  command-and-control  regulation.  These  points  hold
notwithstanding current and anticipated technological developments.2  Of
course,  the  appropriate  attitude  toward  such  instruments  is pragmatic,
empirical, and experimental,  rather than dogmatic or theological. If these
instruments fail to work, it will be worthwhile to consider alternatives.
If measures of this kind have promise in the areas  of environmental
protection  and  public  interest  programming,  there  is  every  reason  to
explore them in other, less familiar contexts as well. In many areas of law,
command-and-control  regulation has proved a partial or complete failure,
and the natural alternative-a  system of well-defined property rights and
freedom of contract-may  produce serious  problems of its own. In such
circumstances,  any "third way,"  if it is ultimately to develop for the mod-
em regulatory state, is likely  to place heavy reliance  on disclosure, eco-
nomic incentives, and voluntary self-regulation.
244.  See Goldberg et al., supra  note 5, at 296 (footnote omitted), arguing that:
A further point of some importance is that there is no single new media form or market, and
there is never likely to be such uniformity. Markets remain distinct; for example there is still
a clear distinction  between  television-type  services  and on-line  services.  Technological
convergence  may  be imminent  in  the  form of television  Internet  access  (or Web  TV)
becoming cheaply available, but the cultures remain radically different. Indeed, in the context
of television, it seems likely that, though delivery  forms may change, the culture may not,
and that new  types of media may  supplement rather than replace  existing ones.  Again the
message is one of caution before we scrap existing regulatory arrangements.CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
The most fundamental points involve the appropriate understanding of
a system of free expression-an understanding of what gives such a system
its motivation and point. I have emphasized the external benefits that come
from public interest programming  and also the peculiar characteristics  of
the television market, where viewers,  or eyeballs,  are a commodity pro-
vided to advertisers. Because of the collective action problem,  regulatory
efforts that attempt to promote democratic goals, or that provide captioning
for the hearing impaired, are easily defended in principle. But I have also
argued that purely economic principles  should be rejected  as the founda-
tion for communications  policy. With respect to public interest program-
ming,  viewers'  tastes  may  be  a  product  of  an  undesirable  set  of
communications options, and in their capacity as citizens, people may weli
want to make things better rather than worse. Especially in light of the role
of the communications  media in the production  of culture-and on both
preferences and values-it is entirely  legitimate for a democratic  govern-
ment to refuse to make "consumption choices" the exclusive basis for pol-
icy design.  I  have  emphasized  that a  public committed  to deliberative
democracy might well support initiatives  designed  to provide better pro-
gramming for children and better coverage of public issues.45  So long as
they are subject to democratic control, such initiatives  should be regarded
not as a paternalistic interference with private choices by a regulatory  elite,
but as an effort by a self-governing  public to promote  a political culture
that is consistent with its own highest aspirations.  Above  all, this is  the
sense in which there is a difference between the public interest and what
interests the public.
245.  See PRICE, supra  note 9, at 245-46, for related conclusions.
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